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Executive Summary 
The number of business incubators and accelerators in the UK has grown rapidly over the last 
few years. This growth has been facilitated by public funding; in this study we estimate that 
between £20-30 million of public funding (UK and EU) is being spent on UK incubators and 
accelerators per year. Despite this, relatively little robust evidence exists regarding their 
impact.  
In this study we explore how incubators and accelerators impact the startups they support and 
investigate which types of support (e.g. provision of workspace, mentoring, funding or training) 
drive this impact. We also examine how incubators and accelerators may impact the wider 
business ecosystems in which they belong. 
Most startups consider the contribution of the incubator or accelerator they attended to 
have been significant or even vital to their success 
Through a survey of 428 startups that have previously or are currently attending (i.e. received 
some combination of support from) an incubator or accelerator, we find that most startups 
consider the contribution of the incubator or accelerator as significant or vital to their success. 
Those that attended an incubator are slightly more likely (73%) to report attendance as being 
significant or vital to their success than those that attended an accelerator (64%).  
Accelerator participation is positively associated with startup survival, employee 
growth, and funds raised 
Incubators and accelerators are often selective, only taking on the best startups which apply; 
this makes it difficult to determine their additionality. To disambiguate this selection effect, we 
use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to analyse data from one notable corporate 
accelerator. We compare outcomes of startups that, on application, scored just above and just 
below the threshold for being interviewed to compete for a spot on the programme. We find 
that attending this accelerator is positively associated with three outcomes measures: survival 
(measured by continued online presence), employee growth, and funds raised. 
Most types of support offered by incubators and accelerators are positively associated 
with at least one outcome measure, but few interventions can be positively linked with 
multiple outcomes 
Our survey of startups reveals that startups perceived direct funding to be the most useful 
support they received as part of their incubator or accelerator programme. This was followed 
by access to office space, lab space and technical equipment.  
We also use a series of regression models to test the effect of receiving different types of 
support on the following outcome measures: the startup’s overall perception of the impact of 
attending the programme, growth in employees since attending, change in proportion of 
employees that hold a degree, change in development stage, innovativeness (as perceived by 
startup), number of patent applications, R&D expenditure and investment raised.  
We find that whilst most types of support have a significant positive association with at least 
one of the outcome measures above, there was little consistency across the measures. We 
find strongest evidence that the following types of support may have a positive impact: access 
to investors, access to peers, help with team formation, direct funding from the programme, 
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press or media exposure, mentoring from an industry expert, help measuring social impact, 
mentoring from a venture capitalist (VC) / angel. All of these are significantly related to two or 
more of the outcome measures described above. 
While some types of support offered by incubators and accelerators appear to have a 
direct impact on startup outcomes, others seem to be mediated by changes in startup 
behaviour 
Using further regression models, we explore how the changes that startups make as a result of 
receiving different types of support may lead to positive outcomes. We find that while some 
support types (e.g. access to peers and coaching/personal development) appear to act directly 
on improving startup outcomes, others seem to work through changing how startups approach 
raising finance, strategic planning, developing and recruiting staff and partnering with external 
organisations. 
Accelerators have positive spillover effects on the wider business ecosystem 
In order to understand how accelerators may have a positive impact on the wider business 
ecosystem in which they belong, we draw on a commercial dataset to analyse how the launch 
of an accelerator affects the amount of investment going to non-accelerated startups in that 
region. We exploit the staggered formation of accelerators across boroughs in the UK 
(excluding London) and the focus of these programmes on accelerating high-tech firms. We 
find that the launch of an accelerator is associated with a significant increase in the number 
and value of investments made by VCs into non-accelerated seed and high-tech companies, 
relative to non-accelerated seed but non-high-tech firms.  
Based on insights from our research we present a number of recommendations for what public 
funders, programmes and local enterprise partnerships can do to support the sector: 
For public funders: 
Invest in pilot programmes and further research to understand good practice, displacement 
effects and the longevity of impact incubators and accelerators have. 
Continue to investigate other types of intervention (e.g. tax credits, direct grants and network 
building) alongside incubators and accelerators. 
Make data-sharing obligatory for incubators and accelerators receiving public funding. 
For incubators and accelerators: 
Assess your own impact or share data with researchers to do it for you and use data-driven 
insights to optimise your programme design. 
For Local Enterprise Partnerships: 
Understand how incubators and accelerators can be part of your Local Industrial Strategy and 
connect with other LEPs in order to share experiences and best practices when working with 
incubators and accelerators. 
 
The impact of business accelerators and incubators in the UK 
7 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Aims of this report  
This report follows a previous study, Business incubators and accelerators: the national 
picture, which was produced by Nesta for BEIS in April 2017 (Bone et al. 2017). This earlier 
study described the landscape of accelerators and incubators in the UK, including information 
about their geographical and sectoral distribution, as well as sources of funding. However, 
questions about the effectiveness of UK accelerators and incubators on the startups they 
support, as well as their impact on the wider business ecosystem, were outside the scope of 
that study. These questions are of significant importance to policymakers, however, especially 
given the insights from the previous report that the number of accelerators and incubators 
continues to grow rapidly – and that this growth is being enabled largely by public funding. 
Based on data collected for this study, we estimate that between £20-30 million of public 
funding (UK and EU) is currently being spent on accelerators and incubators in the UK per 
year.1 Assessing the impact of such programmes is thus of crucial importance in deciding 
whether this is a cost-effective means of supporting new ventures.  
This report will therefore: 
Explore previous literature on the impact of accelerators and incubators, both on the startups 
they support and on the broader business ecosystem; 
Produce new evidence concerning the impact that accelerators have on the startups they 
support, by comparing the outcomes of participating versus unsuccessful applicants to a 
notable corporate accelerator; 
Examine the key objectives of UK accelerators and incubators, and what barriers they face in 
reaching these objectives, through a survey of nearly 100 UK accelerators and incubators; 
Determine which types of support offered by incubators and accelerators (e.g. provision of 
workspace, mentoring, funding or training) add the most value to participating startups, by 
analysing the effect of the different types of support received on the outcomes of participants of 
109 accelerators and incubators; 
Produce a ‘theory of change’ which explains how these types of support make their impact, 
based on a quantitative analysis which draws on responses from a survey of 441 accelerator 
and incubator participants; 
Explore what effect UK incubators and accelerators have on their broader business 
ecosystem, by analysing the effect that a new programme being launched in a region has on 
venture capital being raised by non-accelerated startups in that region. 
 
1 Using data collected from this study’s survey of accelerator and incubator managers, we estimated the average 
amount of public funding received by publicly-funded programmes by multiplying each programme’s reported 
annual costs (after removing outliers) by the percentage of their funding mix which they reported as coming from  
public funding. This gives an estimated average government contribution of £187,150. We then estimated the total 
amount spent by public funders per year in the UK by extrapolating this to all accelerators and incubators in the 
2017 directory (see Bone, Allen, and Haley 2017) which reported receiving public funding (n = 141). This gives an 
estimated total government expenditure on incubators and accelerators of £26.4 million. To take into account the 
large margin of error in this calculation we estimate that the true number is somewhere between £20-30m 
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Investigate how Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and Growth Hubs interact with or 
support accelerators and incubators in their region, and how these interactions help both 
parties reach their objectives, through interviews with 22 LEPs. 
We hope that this study will be of interest to policymakers who are involved in stimulating 
innovation and entrepreneurship and are interested in improving their understanding of forms 
of startup support. We believe this report will also be of use to incubator and accelerator 
managers who are interested in how they can improve the cost-effectiveness of the support 
package they offer, or who wish to measure and better report (to current or potential funders, 
say) their programme’s own impact in the future. 
The study was commissioned by BEIS and prepared by authors from the innovation foundation 
Nesta in collaboration with the London School of Economics, The Open University and 
commercial startup data provider Beauhurst. Errors and omissions are the responsibility of the 
authors alone. 
1.2 What are business incubators and accelerators? 
Accelerators and incubators share the common goal of supporting startups through the early 
and fragile stages of growth. This support can – in theory – help firms avoid the mistakes of 
others, access funding quicker, grow faster and increase their chances of survival. In this way 
they both fall under the broader concept of “business incubation” - an umbrella term for a range 
of support activities, provided by a variety of organisations, not just as the services provided by 
a self–identified ‘incubator’ (Dee et al. 2015). 
Bone et al. (2017) identified that at the time of data collection (November 2016 - March 2017) 
there were 205 incubators2 and 163 accelerators in the UK, as well as some slight variations 
on these themes in the form of 11 pre-accelerators, 7 virtual accelerators and 4 virtual 
incubators. However, at the time of that study, the number of programmes was still growing 
and so we would estimate that the total would likely be larger today. 
We follow Bone et al. (2017) in our definitions of incubators and accelerators (Figure 1) and will 
recap briefly what the similarities and differences are between them and highlight some key 
facts and figures about the support they offer, their funding models, and their sectoral and 
geographic distribution. Throughout this report, for ease of readability, we will collectively refer 
to incubators and accelerators as ‘programmes’, even though incubators are not strictly 
programme-based in the same way as accelerators. 
 
2 This number includes three University Enterprise Zones (UEZ): The Ingenuity Lab in Nottingham, Future Space 
in Bristol and Digital Health Enterprise Zone in Bradford. These UEZs are a wider concept than that of an 
incubator, representing specific geographical areas where universities and business work together to increase 
local growth and innovation. Each UEZ will be supported by a partnership between a university, Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) and others. They have been included because parts of the UEZs share the characteristics 
we associate with incubators. 
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Figure 1: Defining Characteristics of Incubators and Accelerators T
 
Source: (Bone et al. 2017) adapted from (Dempwolf, Auer, and Fabiani 2014)  
1.2.1 Incubators 
Incubators are not a recent phenomenon: the oldest incubator in the UK is St John’s Innovation 
Centre in Cambridge, which launched in 1987. They are primarily physical workspaces – most 
studies, such as (CSES 2002) see the provision of physical space as central to the incubator 
model – with the addition of some shared facilities and business support services, such as 
mentoring, training and access to investors. Incubators typically provide their services on 
relatively flexible terms, taking on new businesses on an ad-hoc basis (i.e. they are not cohort-
based) for an open-ended duration (on average around two years; Bone et al. 2017). 
The majority of incubators are at least partly self-funded through the membership fees or rent 
they charge their residents. However, they are often also subsidised by a university or public 
funding (Bone et al. 2017).3 The relationship between incubators and universities often goes 
beyond just funding, many being directly managed by a university and supporting spin-outs 
along with other local businesses.4 By charging rent, rather than taking equity in the 
businesses they support, incubators are able to support businesses that are unlikely to scale 
rapidly and thus, while often having certain eligibility criteria, they are typically less competitive 
than accelerator programmes. 
Incubators in the UK support an estimated 6,900 businesses at any one time. While the 
majority do not have any specific sectoral focus or broadly cater to digital technology 
businesses, those that are sector-specific typically focus on life sciences and other science-
based sectors such as engineering, healthcare or renewable energy.5 Incubators are relatively 
evenly distributed around the UK, often in university campuses or out-of-town science and 
business parks (Bone et al. 2017; see Figure 2).  
 
3 72% of incubators reported being at least partly funded by membership fees / rent, 43% by public money and 
34% by a university. 
4 An analysis of the BEIS UK incubator and accelerator directory shows that 99 incubators mention a university 
either in their programme name or as their organisation name, suggesting that they are university managed. 
5 45% of incubators reported having no sectoral focus, 29%  having a non-specific focus on digital technologies, 
26% a focus Life Sciences, 14% on engineering and manufacturing, 13% on Health and wellbeing and 11% on 
Energy and the Environment. 
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1.2.2 Accelerators 
Accelerators are a more recent phenomenon than incubators, their origins often being traced 
back to the US programme Y Combinator, which was established in 2005. A few years later6, 
accelerators began to appear in the UK and their number has grown rapidly since – driven 
initially by venture capital, and more recently by corporate funding.  
Accelerators, unlike incubators, offer their services through an intensive cohort-based 
programme of limited duration (usually 3-12 months)7 and typically focus on services over 
physical space (Bone et al. 2017).8 They periodically take in cohorts of startups via a highly 
competitive process, which is in principle open to all applicants (Clarysse et al. 2015)  
Whilst relatively rare in incubators,9 six out of ten accelerators offer direct funding into 
participating startups. The majority make investment in return for equity, but some offer other 
funding such as grants, debt or convertible notes (Bone et al. 2017). 
Because accelerators often base their business model on equity from the startups they 
support, they are more growth-driven; this means that they are typically more selective than 
incubators, only accepting startups which they think have high growth potential and aiming for 
these companies to scale rapidly or fail fast, thus minimising wasted resources. 
While early accelerator programmes were primarily funded by venture capitalists seeking to 
deal-flow, this is now relatively rare; instead, the majority of accelerators are now funded by 
either corporates or the public sector.10 The high level of corporate interest (and funding) into 
accelerators is a relatively recent phenomenon and may be one of the key factors which has 
driven the rapid growth of such programmes in recent years. 
An estimated 3,660 new businesses per year are supported by accelerators in the UK. As with 
incubators, the majority of UK accelerators are cross-sectoral. Where there is a specific focus, 
this is often based around on a digital trend such as Fintech, Agritech, Edtech, Cybersecurity 
or Smart cities. 
Accelerators are particularly concentrated in the capital, with more than half of UK accelerators 
based in London. However, as the number of accelerators has grown, an increasing proportion 
are basing themselves in other startup clusters such as Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge and 
Manchester (Figure 2). 
1.2.3 Variations 
Whilst we have presented incubators and accelerators as distinct archetypes, there is much 
hybridisation and variation. One noteworthy variation is the online ‘virtual’ incubator or 
accelerator11, which offers similar support to its physical counterpart, but without the provision 
of work, office or laboratory space, and with services such as mentoring and access to 
networks being provided online. Another significant variant on the accelerator model is the 
 
6 Seedcamp launched in London in 2007, making it the oldest UK accelerator which is currently active. 
7 The average size of a cohort was 16 businesses and the average length of a programme was just over 6 months 
(27 weeks). 
8 While (by definition) 100% of incubators offer office / work space, it was only reported to be offered by 54% of 
accelerators. 
9 Direct funding is offered by only 14% of incubators. 
10 Dedicated venture capital firms only fund around 8% of UK accelerators, while corporates fund 51% and public 
funders 41%. 
11 Virtual accelerators offer support through a fixed term, cohort based programme, whereas virtual incubators, 
like standard incubators, are more flexible in how and when support is offered. 
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‘pre-accelerator’, which provides very early-stage support, lasting from a day to a month, to 
entrepreneurs who aim to join an accelerator programme in the future.  
Alongside these models are an array of other forms of business incubation which offer similar 
types of support. These include ‘startup studios’ which aim to generate multiple, parallel ideas 
in-house before spinning them out,12 as well as a trend for coworking spaces and venture 
capital funds starting to provide services more traditionally associated with incubators and 
accelerators such as workspace and mentoring.13 
Figure 2: Map of Incubators and Accelerators in the UK 
 
Source: (Bone et al. 2017) adapted from (Dempwolf, Auer, and Fabiani 2014). Please note that 
in areas of high programme density, triangles may overlap meaning that individual incubators 
and accelerators are not distinguishable. 
  
 
12 See http://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/startup-studios-better-model-build-startups-1 
13 Also see Deep Science Ventures, another programme which challenges our definitions by aiming to bring 
together ‘founder-type’ scientists to create and scale ventures. 
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2. Prior evidence on the impact of 
incubators and accelerators 
Researchers have been trying to assess the impact of business incubators and accelerators 
for nearly as long as the models have existed. However, previous work is fragmented in terms 
of the comparisons made, their methodological approaches and the outcome measures used.  
Below we present a review of the past literature on the impact of incubators and accelerators 
on the overall outcomes of participating startups, the effect of programme design, as well as 
the impact on the wider business ecosystem. 
Note that this report does not attempt to be a systematic review of the entire literature on 
accelerators and incubators; for such an overview, we direct the reader towards (What Works 
Centre for Local Economic Growth 2017a, [b] 2017; Hackett and Dilts 2004; Mian et al. 2016; 
Hausberg and Korreck 2018). Table 1 gives a summary of the literature reviewed.14 For an 
extended literature review see Appendix 5.1. 
2.1 Impact on overall outcomes of participating startups 
One of the major challenges in conducting research into the impact of incubators or 
accelerators is that there rarely is one single measure of success. Many programmes are 
themselves unclear whether their primary motivation is to improve firm survival, create wealth 
or create jobs. This issue has been apparent for some time (see. Phan et al. 2005; Van Hove 
et al. 2015), and clearly complicates analysis. 
A second challenge is the fact that many programmes, especially accelerators, typically are 
highly selective – that is, they aim to take only the highest quality startups. As a result, we 
would expect ‘graduates’ of selective programmes to be more successful than non-
participating firms, regardless of whether or not the programme itself contributes to this 
success. A further complication results from the possibility that if the very best quality startups 
decide they do not require external support and thus do not apply to programmes, then self-
selection by startups may bias findings in the opposite direction, resulting in the 
underestimation of programme impact. Research that does not take these selection bias into 
account risks incorrectly estimating the effect of a programme. 
A related issue is the signalling effect: since many programmes are not only highly selective 
but are known to be so, participation may be perceived as a mark of quality which, in itself, 
impacts a firm’s subsequent opportunities. For example, since YCombinator is known as 
producing high quality firms, ‘graduates’ will find it easier to gain the attention of investors.15 
Unlike the selection effect, this signalling effect is a genuine contribution towards success by 
 
14 The earliest studies that explored the impact of the fluid field of startup support, looked at the impact of being 
located on a Science Parks (e.g. (Westhead 1997)). A review of the literature on science parks concluded that the 
returns to being located in a science park seem negligible (Siegel, Westhead, and Wright 2003). They speculate 
that imprecise estimates may be due to differences in the types of science parks, their ownership and the types of 
services provided to firms. 
15 In a similar way, the signalling value of educational degrees is hotly debated by economists, in a field pioneered 
by Nobel Laureate Michael Spence. 
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the programme – but is more a function of the programme’s past performance (including its 
ability to select) than the support directly provided to current firms.  
Several studies have tried to assess the overall impact accelerators and incubators have on 
the startups they support. While some studies make little or no attempt to take into account the 
selectivity of programmes (Christiansen 2014; Rothaermel and Thursby 2005a, [b] 2005; 
Roberts et al. 2016; Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2019; Amezcua 
et al. 2013; Amezcua 2010),16 others and have used various methods to try and control for the 
selection bias mentioned above.  
One method that has been used to test the effect of incubators is to analyse the effect the 
amount of time spent in an incubator has on outcomes for firms (Rothaermel and Thursby 
2005a, [b] 2005). While only looking at participating startups removes the issue of programme 
selectivity, because it does not allow comparisons with startups that did not attend a 
programme at all, conclusions about overall impact that can be drawn from such analyses are 
limited. 
The most common method of analysing the impact of incubators and accelerators is to 
compare participating startups to a matched control group of similar firms (Colombo and 
Delmastro 2002; Schwartz 2009; Yu 2016; Smith and Hannigan 2015; Hallen et al. 2014; 
Lasrado et al. 2016). However, it is not clear whether the characteristics used to conduct this 
matching adequately represent those that contribute to firm success in the selection process. 
Colombo and Delmastro (2002b), for example, use firms’ location, industry, age, and legal form 
to perform matching of firms but later find evidence that incubators attract firms with better-
than-average human capital, which they do not control for. 
A potentially more robust method used is to compare the outcomes of participating startups 
with those that applied to but were narrowly rejected from a programme (Hallen et al. 2016). 
Better still, Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee (2016) and Fehder (2015) robustly take into 
account the selectivity of the accelerator they study by controlling for differences in quality 
among applicants using the numerical scores given to firms by judges when applying to the 
accelerator (using what is known as a regression discontinuity design, RDD; Thistlethwaite and 
Campbell 1960).  
Bringing together evidence from studies using these different methodologies, there is some 
moderately strong evidence that incubators can increase the rate at which participating firms 
grow in employee size (Colombo and Delmastro 2002; Lasrado et al. 2016; Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2019). However, evidence for incubators’ effect on 
survival rates is mixed, with one study finding that incubators increase survival (Rothaermel 
and Thursby 2005b) and another suggesting that they decrease survival rates (Schwartz 
2009). While decreasing survival rates may appear to suggest that these incubators have a 
negative impact on the startups they support, this may not necessarily be the case. Rather, it 
may indicate that incubators can help firms understand the viability (or unviability) of their idea, 
resulting in them killing bad business ideas sooner than they otherwise would; and thus 
preventing time and money being wasted on businesses that were doomed from the get-go. 
Furthermore, Rothaermel and Thursby (2005a) find that firms that remain longer within an 
incubator may be less likely to raise VC funds but more likely to generate significantly higher 
 
16 For example, by simply comparing participating startups to those that applied but were not accepted e.g. 
Roberts et al. (2016), comparing outcomes of startups moving to an incubator with those moving to another 
property (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2019), comparing outcomes of startups which 
have participated in incubators and accelerators with different attributes (Amezcua et al. 2013; Amezcua 2010), 
surveying perceived impact of participating startups (Christiansen 2014) or analysing the effect the amount of time 
spent in an incubator (Rothaermel and Thursby 2005a, [b] 2005). 
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revenues. This illustrates some of the tensions that are apparent, and the need to define 
success criteria before one can determine performance. 
Evidence for the impact of accelerators is slightly stronger. We have moderately strong 
evidence that accelerators can increase the speed at which startups raise investment (Roberts 
et al. 2016; Hallen et al. 2016; Fehder 2015; Hallen et al. 2014), gain customer traction (Hallen 
et al. 2016, 2014), grow their number of employees (Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee 2016; 
González-Uribe and Reyes 2019; Lasrado et al. 2016; Fehder 2015), and reduce the time it 
takes them to be acquired (Hallen et al. 2016; Smith and Hannigan 2015). We also have some 
weaker evidence that accelerators may increase the rate at which firms grow their revenues 
(Lasrado et al. 2016; Roberts et al. 2016). Furthermore, as with incubators, accelerators may 
help funders to understand the viability of their business idea and thus, help bad ideas to ‘fail 
faster’ (Smith and Hannigan 2015; Yu 2016). 
To further complicate the picture, while Lasarado et al. (2016) shows that university affiliated 
programmes are associated with faster sales and job growth than those not connected to a 
university, another study by Amezcua (2010), finds that while university affiliation has a 
positive effect on firm survival, it has no effect on employment or revenue growth of 
participating firms. 
While the studies above give us some indication of the impact of incubators and accelerators 
on the startups they support, they are far from conclusive – and leave unanswered questions 
about how these findings can be transposed from overseas into the UK context. Alongside this, 
only a few – such as (Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee 2016; González-Uribe and Reyes 2019; 
Fehder 2015) – satisfactorily control for the selectivity of programmes.  
2.2 The effect of programme design on impact 
Many of the studies described above treat programmes as ‘black boxes’. However, several 
studies have attempted to look inside these boxes in order to understand what types of support 
offered by incubators and accelerators add the most value to participating startups. Once 
again, evidence on this question is weaker for incubators than for accelerators. 
The type of support offered by incubators and accelerators appears to be important to the 
impact of programmes. There is moderately strong evidence that providing networking 
opportunities (Amezcua et al. 2013; Hallen et al. 2016; Christiansen 2014; Roberts et al. 2016) 
and mentoring (Hallen et al. 2016; Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee 2016; Christiansen 2014) 
are important to the success of incubators and accelerators. We also have some weak 
evidence that management training may be beneficial (Amezcua et al. 2013). However, the 
impact of other forms of support (e.g. office space, direct funding, and demo days) is less 
clear. 
2.3 The effect of incubators and accelerators on the broader 
business ecosystem  
It is of interest to policymakers not only what impact incubators and accelerators have on the 
startups they support, but also what spillovers they may create – that is to say, whether (and 
how) such programmes may affect the startup ecosystem more generally. The stronger such 
spillover effects, the greater the argument for public support of such programmes.  
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We have some evidence that incubators may promote the creation of high-quality jobs in their 
region (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2019) and that accelerators 
may bring an increase in VC funding going to non-accelerated firms as well to those which do 
participate (Hochberg and Fehder 2015). The latter study however, is focussed on the US and 
it is not clear how this will translate to the UK context. 
Table 1: Summary of literature review 
Study Focus Conclusions Method Country of programme(s) 
Rothaermel 
and 
Thursby 
(2005b) 
Incubators 
Incubators may protect 
firms from failure during 
residence, but not 
increase post-graduation. 
This effect is stronger for 
university affiliated, than 
non-university affiliated, 
incubators. 
Analyses what 
effect the 
amount of time 
spent in 
incubators has 
on failure / 
graduation 
rates 
US 
Rothaermel 
and 
Thursby 
(2005a) 
Incubators 
Firms that remain longer 
within an incubator may 
be less likely to raise VC 
funds but more likely to 
generate significantly 
higher revenues 
Analyses what 
effect the 
amount of time 
spent in 
incubators has 
on failure / 
graduation 
rates 
US 
Hallen et al. 
(2016) Accelerators 
Positive effect on survival 
by some, but not all, early 
accelerators 
Compares 
accelerator 
participants to 
those almost 
accepted onto 
the same 
cohorts 
US 
Fehder and 
Hochberg 
(2014) 
Accelerators 
Launch of an accelerator 
was associated with an 
increase in the number of 
VC deals and the total 
amount invested in the 
region 
Compares 
changes in 
regions 
following launch 
of an 
accelerator with 
similar regions 
that do not have 
one 
US 
Smith and 
Hannigan 
(2015) 
Accelerators 
Positive impact of ‘top’ 
accelerators on speed of 
exit (acquisition or 
quitting); negative impact 
Compares 
outcomes of 
accelerated 
startups to 
matched group 
of non-
US 
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Study Focus Conclusions Method Country of programme(s) 
on speed of follow-on 
funding. 
accelerated 
startups 
Yu (2016) Accelerators 
Negative impact on funds 
raised and survival 
(though possibly 
deliberate) 
Compares 
outcomes of 
accelerated 
startups to 
matched group 
of non-
accelerated 
startups 
US 
Hallen et al. 
(2014) Accelerators 
Positive effect on VC 
raised, and on customer 
traction by some, but not 
all, accelerators 
Compares 
outcomes of 
accelerated 
startups to 
matched group 
of non-
accelerated 
startups 
US 
Roberts et 
al. (2016) Accelerators 
Accelerated firms had 
higher revenue growth 
and investment growth, 
but no effect on employee 
growth. Networking 
opportunities and access 
to funding (direct and 
indirect) were perceived to 
be the most useful types 
of support by participating 
Compares 
outcomes of 
accelerator 
participants to 
startups that 
applied, but 
were not 
accepted onto a 
programme 
Worldwide 
Colombo 
and 
Delmastro 
(2002a) 
Incubators 
Positive impact on 
employee growth; no 
effect on R&D intensity 
Compares 
outcomes of 
incubated 
startups to 
matched group 
of non-
incubated 
startups 
Italy 
Schwartz 
(2013) Incubators 
Negative effect on survival 
(though possibly 
deliberate) 
Compares 
outcomes of 
incubated 
startups to 
matched group 
of non-
incubated 
startups 
Germany 
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Study Focus Conclusions Method Country of programme(s) 
Lasrado et 
al. (2016) 
Incubators 
and 
accelerator 
Positive effect on growth 
(of revenue and 
employees) for incubators 
and accelerators. 
University affiliation 
incubation is associated 
with growth than non-
university incubation. 
Compares 
outcomes of 
incubated 
startups to 
matched group 
of non-
incubated 
startups 
US 
Department 
for 
Business, 
Energy and 
Industrial 
Strategy 
(2019) 
Incubators 
and 
accelerator 
Positive effect of 
incubators on growth of 
participating startups 
(turnover, employees and 
productivity) with no 
observed displacement 
effect for the surrounding 
area. Also, increased 
high-quality jobs in area 
surrounding incubator site. 
Compares 
outcomes of 
startups moving 
to an incubator 
with those 
moving to 
another 
property. Also 
tests impact of 
moving to a 
property located 
in area 
surrounding an 
incubator site. 
United Kingdom 
Amezcua 
(2010) 
Incubators 
and 
accelerators 
University affiliation has a 
positive effect on firm 
survival 
Compares 
outcomes of 
startups which 
have 
participated in 
different 
incubators and 
accelerators 
US 
Amezcua et 
al. (2013) 
Incubators 
and 
accelerators 
For firms operating in a 
competitive business 
environment, participating 
in an incubator or 
accelerator that offers 
networking and 
management training 
produces firms with higher 
survival rates 
Compares 
outcomes of 
startups which 
have 
participated in 
different 
incubators and 
accelerators 
US 
González-
Uribe and 
Reyes 
(2019) 
Accelerators 
Positive impact of 
entrepreneurship 
schooling (i.e., no funding) 
on sales, employment and 
profits. The impact is 
Instrumental 
variables 
exploiting 
random 
allocation of 
applicants to 
evaluators with 
Colombia 
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Study Focus Conclusions Method Country of programme(s) 
concentrated on high-
growth startups. 
different scoring 
generosities. 
Gonzalez-
Uribe and 
Leatherbee 
(2016) 
Accelerators 
Positive impact of 
entrepreneurship 
schooling bundled with 
basic services on 
employment. No evidence 
that basic services of 
funding and coworking 
space affect performance 
on their own. 
Regression 
Discontinuity 
Design 
Chile 
Fehder 
(2015) Accelerators 
Positive effect on both 
employment and funds 
raised 
Regression 
Discontinuity 
Design 
US 
Christianse
n (2014) Accelerators 
Most participating startups 
believe that accelerators 
are adding value in 
excess of the funding they 
give 
Surveys 
participating 
startups about 
what they 
perceive the 
impact of the 
accelerator they 
attended to be 
Worldwide 
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3. New Research 
3.1 What are the goals and objectives of incubators and 
accelerators? 
3.1.1 Methods 
Focus group discussions 
We held four focus group events at Nesta in December 2017 and January 2018. The primary 
aims of these focus groups was to better understand the goal-setting processes of incubators 
and accelerators and the feasibility of our research approach, as well as to gain further insights 
into the best way to ask questions and the response options we should give in the subsequent 
surveys. Separate events were held for accelerator managers, incubator managers, 
accelerator attendees and incubator attendees.17 Incubators, accelerators and participating 
startups were chosen such to try and represent different geographies, sectors and funding 
models as best as possible. The topic guides and agenda for these focus groups are listed in 
Appendix 5.2.  
Survey of accelerators and incubators 
Between February and March 2018, we surveyed accelerators and incubators in order to gain 
insights into what objectives were most important to their programmes; what they perceive as 
their programme’s biggest benefits for participating startups (see Section 3.42 for results) and 
what they saw as their main barriers to more impact (see Section 3.82 for results). The survey 
was disseminated to all incubators and accelerators in the online directory which was produced 
by Nesta for BEIS in April 2017.18 In total, 99 programmes (61 incubators and 38 accelerators) 
completed the survey, which represents more than 25% of the overall pool of 368 programmes 
in the UK. The incubators and accelerators surveyed are slightly larger, on average, than the 
national average19 and are reasonably representative with regard to geographical 
distribution.20 Compared to the national average, our survey sample contains considerably 
more incubators and accelerators with a specific sectoral focus (e.g. Education, Fintech or 
Agritech) than the national population.21  
 
17 N = 7,8,7,5, respectively. 
18 The online directory (thought to be comprehensive at time of publication in 2017) is available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/business-incubators-and-accelerators-the-national-picture 
19 On average the accelerators surveyed take on 25 new business a year (national average = 22) and the 
incubators take on 54 new businesses a year (national average = 34). National averages are according to Bone et 
al. 2017. 
20 Some exceptions to this are that our sample contains no accelerators in the North East (national percentage = 
3%), East Midlands (national percentage = 5%), South East (national percentage = 6%) or Wales (national 
percentage = 2%) and no incubators in Wales (national percentage = 3%) or Northern Ireland (national 
percentage = 1.45%). Our sample also contains a considerably lower percentage of accelerators in the West 
Midlands (3%) than the national average (7%) and a considerably higher percentage of incubators in London 
(38%) than the national average (14%).  
21 21% of incubators and 20% of accelerators in this sample reported not having a sectoral focus, compared to a 
national average of 45% and 30% respectively (Bone et al. 2017).  
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3.1.2 Results 
The key objectives of both incubators and accelerators are strategically 
supporting their parent organisation, local economic development / regeneration 
and promoting innovation within a particular industry. 
There was not a single objective that stood out as being considerably more important than the 
others. All five options offered to accelerators and incubators are seen to be important or very 
important to more than half of the programmes surveyed (Figure 3). But, for both incubators 
and accelerators the most important objectives are: strategically supporting their parent 
organisation or local economic development / regeneration or promoting innovation within a 
particular industry. Following closely behind in importance is achieving social impact and 
generating a financial return for owners / investors.  
 
Figure 3: Proportion of programmes that deemed each objective as 'Important' or 'Very 
Important' 
 
What exactly is meant by ‘strategically supporting the parent organisation’ depends on the 
nature of that programme. For example, for those run by a corporate, this may mean promoting 
an entrepreneurial culture internally or finding solutions to specific problems the corporate is 
facing, while for those run by a university this may be about spinning out innovations 
developed from university research or developing the skills of its students and staff. 
In general, there is little difference in what accelerators and incubators reported their objectives 
to be. It is, however, worth noting that accelerators are more likely to regard generating a 
financial return for investors as a key objective. This may be due to the fact that accelerators in 
this sample are nearly two times as likely to be funded by private investment than incubators. 
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Incubators, on the other hand, are slightly more likely to report both strategically supporting the 
parent organisation and local economic development as being important objectives. The varied 
objectives of the programmes surveyed indicates that when measuring their impact, it is 
important to consider not one but several different outcome measures.  
3.2 What is the overall impact of programmes: as perceived by 
participating startups? 
3.2.1 Methods 
Survey of startups 
To understand what startups perceive to be the overall impact of the incubator or accelerator 
they participated in, we conducted a survey of startups that applied to or participated in one of 
these programmes. Data from this survey was also used for analyses asking questions about 
which support types have the most impact on startups (section 3.4) and through which 
mechanisms does support have impact? (Section 3.5). 
Our sampling strategy consisted of two stages between April 2018 and September 2018. In the 
first stage, we asked all accelerators in Nesta’s directory that had programmes in the UK to 
share our survey with their applicants (or else to share applicants’ contact details with us so 
that we might contact them directly). In the second stage, we contacted startups that were 
known by Beauhurst22 to have participated in an accelerator.23 It is important to note that 
Beauhurst does not have information on startups that have been through an incubator. As a 
result, our survey sample was skewed towards startups that had been through an accelerator 
rather than an incubator. 
The total startup sample comprised of 441 enterprises (343 had been through an accelerator, 
66 an incubator, 23 another support type with elements of an accelerators or incubator e.g. 
coworking spaces with additional support services and for 9 the type of programme was 
unknown), of which 324 had participated in an accelerator or incubator, 104 were currently 
participating, and 13 applied but did not participate. Due to accelerators being a relatively 
recent phenomenon, the average startup in our sample joined a programme 2016: 36 startups 
joined in 2018, 96 in 2017, 89 in 2016, 50 in 2015, 20 in 2014, and 31 in 2013 or earlier. As a 
result of our sampling approach, we count 109 unique programmes in our sample.24 See 
Appendix 5.3 for more information on the sample of startups that responded to this survey. 
3.2.2 Results 
Most startups surveyed consider the contribution of incubators and accelerators 
they participated in to be significant or even vital to their success. 
Of the startups we surveyed 43% report that the accelerator or incubator they participated in 
was significant to their success and 23% say that it was vital (Figure 4); only 9% of startups 
find no contribution or a negative impact of their programme on the success of their business. 
 
22 Beauhurst is a searchable database of the UK’s high-growth companies: they track every company raising 
equity, graduating from an accelerator, receiving an innovation grant, spinning out from a university and more. 
23 At the time of the survey Beauhurst had information on 4,690 startups that had been through an accelerator. Of 
these they had a contact email address for 3,086, all of which were contacted about the survey. 
24 Defining programmes run by one parent organisation for multiple clients as a single programme. Individual 
analyses may use fewer observations depending on missing values in the variables considered in each analysis. 
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Accelerators are perceived to have a vital or significant impact less often (64%) than 
incubators25 (73%), but this difference is not statistically significant. This graph shows the 
proportion of responses to each option for the question “Looking back, what impact has the 
support provided by [the accelerator or incubator] had on this enterprise’s chance of success?” 
These proportions closely mirror the findings for companies participating in European 
incubators (CSES 2002). 
Figure 4: Impact of accelerators and incubators.  
 
3.3 What is the overall impact of programmes? An analysis of 
one corporate accelerator  
3.3.1 Methods 
Regression Discontinuity Design 
We are interested in estimating the impact of a specific accelerator on future venture 
performance. To explore this question, whilst attempting to disambiguate the selection effects 
discussed in Section 2.1 above, we follow (Gonzalez-Uribe et al. 2018), using data from the 
same corporate accelerator studied in that work: an accelerator run by a large US-
headquartered technology firm with various locations worldwide, including London. The 
corporate accelerator in question was launched in 2011 and is a 4-month programme for later-
stage startups. It provides no seed capital, and requires no fee or equity stake, but focuses on 
the provision of four services: 1) Shared office space; 2) Free access to software, developer 
tools, and cloud services from the corporate sponsor; 3) Workshops and personalised 
 
25 The majority of these are incubators but it may also include some coworking space and other forms of business 
support. 
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guidance; and 4) Access to the corporate sponsor’s network beyond 4 months through the 
alumni network. 
As argued in more detail in Gonzalez-Uribe et al. (2018), focusing on this corporate accelerator 
is useful on two accounts. First, the structure and services provided by the corporate 
accelerator are standard among business accelerators. Thus, our analysis can be informative 
about the potential impact of corporate accelerators more generally, rather than exclusively 
about the accelerator of the corporate sponsor we focus on. Second, and as explained in more 
detail below, the selection process of the accelerator can be exploited to design an empirical 
strategy that distinguishes the potential impact of the programme, from the ability of the staff in 
picking high quality applicants.  
The selection process for the participants in each cohort at the accelerator is a four-part 
process. First, applicants send their applications online through a specialised platform that 
collates all information for the accelerator. Next, key staff at the accelerator score in groups the 
applications based on the business idea, the market and the team (scores range from 1 to 5; 
with a score of 5 [1] indicating a top [bottom] applicant).26 Given the high demand for the 
programme, and the fact that the scoring process is made as a group, it takes the staff roughly 
two days to go over the applications in each cohort: the goal is to cover 60 applications per 
day. Once the staff reviews all applications, these are then ranked from best to worst based on 
the group scores. Next, the staff interviews the top 20 applicants: interviews are long and in-
depth, and there are constraints to the staff members’ time. Ties are resolved with an open 
discussion until 20 companies (among those ranking in the top 20) are finally chosen. In the 
final step, the staff picks 5-10 participants, depending on predetermined capacity.  
We use data on 638 applicants to 5 cohorts in the London branch of the business accelerator 
during the 2013-2016 period collected by Gonzalez-Uribe et al. (2018).27 The data includes 
information from the applications, including: applicants’ scores, participation status (see 
Appendix 5.4 for sample composition [Table A3] and characteristics of applicants [Table A4]). 
To measure impacts, we use additional information collected by the authors from various 
online sources during 2018 — i.e., within five years of application to the programme.28 
We focus on three main variables to measure applicants’ performance.29 First, Online 
Presence (a measure of firm survival, as used by Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee (2016), Yu 
(2016) and Kerr et al. 2014), an indicator variable of whether the company has a profile on 
LinkedIn and/or Crunchbase (a widely-used business information platform, originally built to 
track startups).30 Second, Change in Employees, which uses the employee size reported in 
 
26 The five individuals scoring the applications include all the chief officers in the accelerator: chief executive 
officer, chief marketing officer, chief technology officer, chief operations officer and chief investment officer. 
27 The application dates for the 5 cohorts closed, respectively during November 2013, July 2014, February 2015, 
September 2015 and January 2016. 
28 The data on the company’s LinkedIn profiles was collected during January-April 2018 and the data from the 
Crunchbase profiles was collected during September-December 2018. Relative to the application dates, these 
data collection points roughly measure employment (fundraising) outcomes 2 (3) years after application at the 
minimum, 4 (5) years after application at the maximum and 3 (4) years at the mean. 
29 We also collected information on patents and trademarks by searching for the company names in the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office patent and trademark files. Less than 5% of the sample firms appeared in 
these files, so we did not include these variables in the analysis. Potential explanations for the limited overlap 
include the concentration of our sample firms in sectors where intellectual property is not usually protected with 
patents. 
30 While online presence is a commonly used measure of firm survival, it is not without caveats. Profiles in 
Crunchbase and LinkedIn are self-reported and are not unilaterally taken-down by platforms if companies die. 
Thus, reliance on this measure of survival risks bias if acceleration alters social media behaviour of firms. The 
direction of this bias, however, is not clear. For example, if acceleration improves social media management of 
The impact of business accelerators and incubators in the UK 
24 
LinkedIn and compares it to the number of employees reported at the application stage.31 
Because LinkedIn does not report the actual number of employees, but rather classifies firms 
into 8 buckets of size, the variable Change in Employees can take the value from -8 to 8.32 
There are a few instances (45) in which the company has a profile on Crunchbase, but no 
profile in LinkedIn. In those situations, we infer the variable Change in Employees using the 
employee size reported in Crunchbase and its comparison to the number of employees 
reported at the application stage.33 Third, Change in Fundraising, which uses information 
reported in Crunchbase on fundraising from outside investors and compares it to the 
information on outside fundraising reported at the application stage. We present results using 
both changes in the levels of fundraising, as well as changes in the logarithms of fundraising.34 
For observations with 0 in the amount of fundraising (at application or post application), we 
replace the value with the logarithm of the unconditional fundraising mean in the sample.35 
Results are robust to running the log regressions without arbitrary replacements of the zero 
values. 
Our empirical strategy is a fuzzy regression discontinuity approach (RD) that exploits the top-
20 interview threshold rule to estimate a local average treatment effect of corporate 
acceleration on new venture performance. This rule implies that the probability of acceleration 
changes discontinuously at the interview threshold as a function of the applicant’s ranking 
Therefore, the difference in expected outcomes between the startups in opposite sides of—but 
sufficiently near—the threshold can provide the basis for an unbiased estimate. For evidence 
of the discontinuity in the probability of acceleration at the interview threshold see Appendix 
5.5.  
To control for differences in characteristics across cohorts, such as number of years between 
the application dates and 2018 (the year we measure performance), we include cohort fixed 
effects in the estimation. These fixed effects effectively restrict the comparison to applicants on 
either side of the interview threshold, but within the same cohort. 
The main identification assumption is that ranks are not precisely manipulated around the 
threshold. Because the scoring of applications is done by judges in group form, where views 
are openly discussed, such manipulation of rankings by applicants or by judges (for example, 
so as to help a friend qualify) is hard in this context. Other factors mitigating potential 
manipulation include the facts that the scoring process extends over more than one day, and 
the fact that backfilling of scores is not permitted (i.e., once assigned, applications scores are 
final). For evidence against the empirical relevance of potential precise manipulation of ranks 
around the threshold see Appendix 5.5. 
A different empirical concern regards the possibility that the evaluation process does not result 
in a continuous score function, particularly in the top of the distribution, and which would be 
 
firms, and given that the propensity to have a profile in either platform at application is the same across selected 
and rejected applicants. 
31 In unreported regressions, we show results are robust to using information on number of employees from 
Crunchbase. 
32 LinkedIn classifies companies into 8 company size codes: 1-10, 11-50, 51-200, 201-500, 501-1,000, 1,001-
5,000, 5,000-10,000 and 10,000+ employees. 
33 Crunchbase classifies companies into 9 company size codes: 1-10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-250, 251-500, 501-
1,000, 1,001-5,000, 5,000-10,000 and 10,000+ employees. 
34 Fundraising values are measured in US dollars; we convert any other currencies using historical exchange 
rates at the time of fundraising and the time of application. 
35 That is, Log Changes in Fundraising=Log Fundraising Post-Log Fundraising Application, where Log 
Fundraising Post= Log(Fundraising Post+Mean(Fundraising Post)) and Log Fundraising Application= 
Log(Fundraising Application +Mean(Fundraising Application)); where Mean(Fundraising Post) equals $457,396 
USD and Mean(Fundraising Application)=$150,565 USD. 
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best suited for the RD design. A group-based evaluation process is more likely to lead to ties 
(i.e., companies with the same score) than evaluations based on average scores from multiple 
judges that individually score the companies. In practice, the prevalence of ties among top 
applicants was low, but varied across cohorts (see Appendix 5.5): all cohorts but two ranked 
less than 26 companies among the top 20 companies.  
To address this concern, we split the cohorts into two groups based on the number of 
applicants ranked among the top-20: bottom 2-quantile and top 2-quantile. Out of the five 
cohorts, three are classified as bottom 2-quantile: cohort 1 with 22 (out of 41) top-20 ties, 
cohort 3 with 23 (out of 130) top-20 ties and cohort 4 with 20 (out of 98) companies in the top 
20. Cohorts 2 and 5 are classified as top 2-quartile with 25 (out of 168) and 37 (out of 201) top-
20 ties, respectively. In the estimation, we allow results to vary by these two groups. Likely 
because the prevalence of ties was low on average, we find no statistically significant 
difference in the results across the two groups (see Appendix 5.5). 
Under the identification assumptions, any average performance differences between firms 
ranking closely to but on either side of the threshold can be attributed to the effects of 
acceleration. Note that any differences are unlikely to be explained by psychological reactions 
to the evaluation: scores were not revealed to any applicant.  
Naturally, it is possible that the accelerator has positive spillover effects, even among the 
companies that do not participate in the program. For example, the arrival of accelerators has 
been found to be positively associated with the development of entrepreneurial ecosystems, as 
measured by venture capital fundraising (see Fehder and Hochberg, 2014; and Section 3.5 
below). In that case, the RD estimate will measure the effects of the programme on 
participants, above and beyond any potential effects of the accelerator on the region. It is 
however, also possible that if accelerated firms in any way compete with un-accelerated firms 
(in product or labour markets or in raising external capital), then it is possible that negative 
spillover effects might occur, leading to effects of the programme being over-estimated 
3.3.2 Results 
Accelerator participation is positively associated with startup survival, employee 
growth, and funds raised 
Using data from one notable corporate accelerator and utilising a regression discontinuity 
design to take into account the selection effects discussed previously, we find that attending 
the accelerator was positively associated with our three outcome variables: survival (as 
measured by online presence; p < 0.01)36, change in number of employees (p < 0.01), and 
change in fundraising (p < 0.01), within five years of application to the programme. 
Importantly, this analysis takes into account the fact that the accelerator is selective of the 
startups that participate by using a regression discontinuity design to compare outcomes of 
startups just above and just below the threshold for being interviewed for a place on the 
programme (based on the numerical scores given to startups on application). Figure 5 
illustrates this in a simplified way, without using real data. The vertical red line shows the 
interview threshold, startups scoring below this threshold (to the right of the red line) were not 
interviewed, those to the right were (on the left). The jump in height (the ‘discontinuity’) 
 
36 In statistical hypothesis testing, the p-value, for a given statistical model, is the probability of finding the 
observed, or more extreme, results when the null hypothesis is true. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
difference between the populations (or no effect of the treatment) being tested. The p-value is a number between 
0 and 1. A small p-value (typically ≤ 0.05) indicates strong evidence against the null hypothesis, so you reject the 
null hypothesis. 
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between the two horizontal lines either side of the interview threshold shows the effect on the 
acceleration probability of being interviewed (the “first stage”), combined with the effect of 
actually participating in the accelerator on future firm performance. Intuitively, our regression 
discontinuity approach estimates the acceleration effect as the ratio between the size of the 
discontinuity and the size of the first stage.  
We find that acceleration leads to an increase of 50% in online presence for the applicants at 
the margin of acceleration. Acceleration also increases employment growth, helping applicants 
transition up, by roughly one level, in the online classification of employee size. Given that the 
average applicant has 5 employees at application (i.e., the first level of online employee size: 
1-10 employees), the estimated average transition is towards the second level of employee 
size: between 11 and 50 employees. Finally, acceleration also increases fundraising by 77.6%. 
Given that the average applicant has raised £115,000 ($150,000 USD, See table A4) at 
application, the estimated fundraising increase from acceleration amounts to circa £90,000.  
Results are robust to controlling for differences in fundraising at the application stage, and to 
using levels or logarithmic transformations to control for outliers. See Appendix 5.6 for a more 
detailed explanation of the results. 
 
Figure 5: A schematic of the regression discontinuity analysis. Note that this chart is 
not using real data but is a simplified representation of the analysis. 
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3.4 Which support types have the most impact on startups? 
3.4.1 Methods 
With data from the survey of startups we conducted (see Section 3.21 for details), we use a 
range of regression models to measure the relationship between types of support provided by 
programmes and outcomes measured at the startup level (obtained through the startups 
survey). In order to understand which types of support have the greatest impact, we exploit the 
fact that different programmes offer different combinations of support. This means that we only 
need to compare outcomes of startups that participated in different programmes (and therefore 
received different types of support), rather than comparing them to outcomes of startups that 
did not participate in a programme at all. This means that programme selectivity is less of an 
issue here and it is not necessary to use a regression discontinuity design (as used in the 
previous Section). We show definitions of the outcome measures, independent variables of 
interest and control variables used in our regression models in Appendix 5.7.37 
Our main models do not distinguish between accelerators, incubators and other programmes 
for two reasons. The first one is theoretical: the goal of these estimations is to find the types of 
support that make a difference to startups irrespective of whether the support is offered by an 
accelerator or incubator. One possible limitation of this approach is that while accelerators and 
incubators offer similar types of support, the time spans over which support is delivered is 
typically quite different. For example, the average length of an accelerator programme is six 
months whereas the average time startups spend in an incubator is around two years. 
Although we know approximately when startups in our sample joined an accelerator or 
incubator (e.g. 90% joined since 2013), we do not know how long they took part in the 
programme for, so our study is unable to determine how the timespan over which different 
types of support are provided affects the impact it has or for how long this impact lasts. 
The second reason is econometric: because support type and mentoring, if modelled correctly, 
encompass the effects of accelerators and incubators on startups, separate control variables 
for accelerators and incubators would be collinear with the support and mentoring variables 
and would destabilise the models. As a robustness test, we re-estimate our main models for 
the subsample of accelerators. 
3.4.2 Results 
Access to peers, mentoring, business skills development and coaching are the 
most common types of support received as part of incubator and accelerator 
programmes  
A large majority of startups that responded to the survey report being provided with access to 
peers, mentoring and business skills development as part of the accelerator or incubator they 
participated in. In addition, most startups receive some personal coaching or development 
alongside typical accelerator services such as office space, help testing and refining their 
business model or networking opportunities with investors (Figure 6). Many programmes offer 
access to potential customers and investors, which reflects the conventional picture of 
 
37   To balance data availability and the level of detail in our results, we run our main regressions with a full set of 
control variables and a reduced set of variables (see Appendix 5.10). In the latter models, we drop insignificant 
variables based on their contribution to the model. This has the disadvantage of changing the set of control 
variables from model to model but can highlight effects may remain hidden in models with too many control 
variables relative to the number of observations. Changing the set of control variables between models is not 
necessarily a problem if one believes that not all control variables are related to all outcomes. 
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accelerators and incubators drawn in the literature. A relatively low observed frequency of 
laboratory space can be explained by the sector distribution within our sample. Similarly, about 
a quarter of startups receive help in measuring their social impact, which reflects the 
substantial proportion of programmes that pursue social and not-for-profit goals. 
Figure 6 below shows the proportion of startups that received each type of support. The types 
of support are ordered by decreasing perceived impact. Not received may refer to both 
services that are not offered by a programme at all or to services that are offered but that the 
startup did not make use of. 
Figure 6: Types of support received by startups 
 
The relatively low proportion of programmes providing direct funding is more surprising given 
the emerging understanding of accelerators as cohort-based programmes with a fixed duration 
that typically provide some equity to startups. Incubators and related programmes are a 
minority in our sample, which suggests that a large proportion of programmes that we 
classified as accelerators or that self-identified as accelerators do not consider direct finance 
as one of their key contributions to startup success. A substantial proportion of 44% of startups 
received help with team formation, which is not typically associated with accelerators that 
usually select businesses with existing teams of founders for their programmes. This type of 
support may thus be more frequent and potentially more important than advertised by 
programmes. 
Our findings are broadly in line with Aerts et al.’s (2007) sample of 107 European incubators. 
Incubators in their sample provide services similar to the ones we measure at a similar 
frequency. One notable exception is the provision of managerial training, which only 47% of 
incubators provide, compared with 84% or 85% of startups in our sample that receive coaching 
or business skills development. 
Most startups were in contact with a mentor for up to two hours a week  
Mentoring support is common in the programmes studied, although its intensity varies greatly 
between programmes (Appendix 5.8, Table A13). About 89% of startups receive mentoring 
support (242 out of 272 that answered the question). The majority of respondents are in 
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contact with a mentor for up to 2 hours per week, while about 6% receive mentoring support for 
more than 9 hours per week. 
There is not one typical way in which mentoring is offered by incubators and 
accelerators 
Mentors are relatively evenly distributed between being industry experts (58%), entrepreneurs 
(both who have sold a business, 57%, and who have not sold a business, 51%), venture 
capitalists or business angels (45%), and consultants or business developers (67%), 
suggesting that there is not a single dominant way of providing mentoring in accelerators or 
incubators.  
When investigating combinations of mentors, a large number of startups (27%) received 
concurrent mentoring support by experts, entrepreneurs, venture capitalists or business 
angels, and consultants. The second most common combination (9%) is mentoring by 
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists or business angels, and consultants, followed by business 
consultants or developers only (8%). This clustering of startups in certain combinations of 
mentoring support suggests that accelerators may have specialised mentoring models. Closer 
inspection of the data suggests, however, that this clustering cannot be observed at the 
accelerator level. In other words, programmes that provide one combination of mentoring 
support to some startups often provide another combination to other startups. 
Incubators and accelerators perceive business skills development and access to 
potential investors to be there most important benefits to startups 
In our survey of accelerator and incubator managers (see Section 3.11 for details about the 
survey), we asked respondents to select what they perceive to be the top three benefits of their 
programmes for startups (Figure 7). From the options we gave, the two most selected benefits 
are business skills development (53%) and access and connections to potential investors 
(51%). The least popular are direct funding (13%), legal, financial and marketing support (8%), 
and help with team formation (3%).  
Accelerators are more likely than incubators to report ‘access to potential investors, partners 
and customers’ as one of their top three benefits. This could be due to the fact that a quarter of 
accelerators (compared to just 10% of incubators) offer startups a demo day, in which startups 
showcase their product or service to individuals and organisations that may want to fund or 
work with them. On the other hand, incubators more often report ‘access and connections to 
peers’ as a top benefit, which may be explained by incubator participants being in a shared 
space for longer time periods. Relative to other benefits provided, accelerators and incubators 
in the UK both place a greater emphasis on networking with similar businesses than European 
incubators (CSES 2002). 
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Figure 7: Importance of support types as perceived by programme  
 
Startups perceive direct funding, access to office space, lab space and technical 
equipment to be the biggest benefits to participating in an incubator or 
accelerator 
We also asked the startups we surveyed about how useful they found the support they 
received (Figure 8). Direct funding is most often reported as being useful, followed by access 
to office space, lab space and technical equipment. These are followed by access to 
connections and peers and coaching / personal development.  
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Figure 8: Perceived impact of support received by startups38 
 
Although they are not directly comparable as questions are not asked in the same way, it is 
interesting to look at what incubators and accelerators see as being the key benefits of their 
programmes versus what startups see as being the most valuable elements of the programme 
they attended. For example, direct funding is thought of as most useful by startups but a lot 
less important by accelerators and incubators. Business skills development is also seen to be 
considerably more important to incubators and accelerators than to startups. While it is not 
clear whether it is programmes or the startups that participate in them that have the best view 
of which services provide the most value, where there appears to be most agreement is 
around the benefits associated with having access to other entrepreneurs (peers) that comes 
with participating in an incubator or accelerator. 
Our findings for UK startups are broadly in line with those for European startups participating in 
incubators (CSES 2002) but differ from those for a global sample collected by Emory 
University (GALI 2017). Emory University’s Entrepreneurship Database Program identified 
network development with partners and customers as the most important contribution of 
accelerators, followed by access to investors or funders, mentorship by experts and securing 
direct funding. In our results, direct funding was seen as an important type of support, while 
access and connections to potential investors received the lowest average score. Tangible 
benefits, such as office space, laboratory space or equipment, are regarded important by 
startups. Surprisingly, startups in the UK valued access to peers much higher than their global 
counterparts, but both groups agree on the relatively small impact of media exposure obtained 
through the accelerator. 
 
38 Mentoring is not featured in this figure because survey respondents were not asked how useful mentoring was. 
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There is little difference between what types of support startups find most useful 
in incubators compared to accelerators 
When looking at accelerators and incubators separately in Figure 9, differences in perceived 
impact by participating startups are relatively small for most support types, though incubators 
generally receive higher impact ratings by startups. An explanation for this finding is the 
typically longer duration of incubator programmes compared with a typical three or six-month 
accelerator programme. When we compare the proportion of respondents that consider the 
support not useful between accelerators and incubators, however, none of the individual 
differences in proportions is significant (at the 10% level of significance using Fisher’s exact 
test) because of the relatively small sample size in the non-accelerator subsample. 
Figure 9: Perceived impact of accelerators and other programmes by support type 
 
Startups suggest less tangible changes in their confidence and mind-set are 
important benefits to participating in an incubator or accelerator 
The importance of funding, networks and programme resources is mirrored in startups’ free-
text responses. We invited respondents to further elaborate on the effect that programmes had 
on their business and their experience of participating. Startups place a strong emphasis on 
networks with peers and an environment that fosters mutual support and a sense of 
community. Help in obtaining finance and mentoring support are also seen as important. 
Interestingly, several startups mention the strong intangible impact that programmes had on 
their confidence and mind-set as an entrepreneur. Respondents commented, for example, the 
programme “boosted my confidence”, “it really stretched me and enabled me to be critiqued 
and ready for the real world” and “it did help me realise how much I hold myself back”. 
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Startups often find programmes focus to heavily on short-term growth 
In the free-text responses, a substantial number of startups reported a desire for programmes 
to have a greater long-term focus of programmes, which too often were said to focus on short-
term growth, quickly finding investors or “ticking boxes”. Startups commented they “were 
pushed to investing into our business in order to scale it which it turned out was not a good 
idea” and “the goal of finding investment is perhaps weighted a bit too heavily over the goal of 
creating a profitable business” (Appendix 5.9).  
It is important to note that the results discussed above reflect only what startups think were the 
most useful types of support they received and does not measure the effect of receiving a 
support type compared to not receiving it, results to this analysis are discussed below. 
Startups which receive access to partners and customers, help in refining and 
testing their business model, and/or help with team formation are most likely to 
think the programme they participated in positively impacted their chance of 
success 
To estimate the impact of support types on startups’ success, we study both perceived and 
objective measures of startup success. We construct this perceived contribution from answers 
to the question “looking back, what impact has the support provided by [programme name] had 
on this enterprise's chance of success?” It is important to note that here startups are being 
asked about how important they perceive the programme as a whole to have been to their 
success, rather than how useful particular types of support they received were, as was 
discussed in the previous Section. 
In a second step, we aim to decompose the perceived impact into effects on objective 
measures of success. This second step serves two purposes: it validates the responses given 
by participants in our survey and helps to understand what factors are ultimately linked to 
objectively measurable startup success.  
In our results in Table 2, we find that three support types are most strongly associated with the 
perceived impact of accelerators by participating startups: help with team formation, testing the 
business model and access to partners and customers. Startups also perceive accelerators 
more positively if they provide direct funding, administrative support, or when a mentor is an 
industry expert, though the effect is of these types of support is less strong as for those 
mentioned above. This result supports the earlier finding in which startups generally report 
direct funding as being very useful (Figure 8), but does not support the previous finding in 
which they do not perceive a similarly positive contribution from access to partners and 
customer and from help in with team formation. A possible explanation for this partial 
disconnect is a misattribution of support types to the overall contribution of the accelerator. 
Startups may perceive an overall positive value of the accelerator support but may not be able 
to accurately assign this contribution to certain support types.  
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Table 2: Summary of impact results. The table below shows the direction and significance of 
coefficients in our optimised models in Appendix 5.10. For example, “+++” represents a 
coefficient that is positive and significant at the p<0.01 level. Similarly, “++” is a positive 
coefficient at the p<0.05 level, and “−” is a negative coefficient at the p<0.1 significance level. 
Dependent variables are: Perceived impact of accelerators perceived by startups; employment 
growth; growth in the number of employees with a degree; progression to a higher stage in a 
firm life cycle; innovation of products, services or processes; patenting (probit model); R&D 
expenditures (Log); and whether any additional investment was raised since applying to the 
accelerator. 
Dependent variable 
Perceiv
ed 
impact 
Emplo
yment 
growth 
Emplo
yees 
with a 
degre
e 
Deve
lopm
ent 
stage 
Inn
ova
tion 
Pat
enti
ng 
R&D 
(Log) 
Investme
nt raised 
Support by 
programme 
        
Access to partners & 
customers 
+++        
Access to investors       +++ +++ 
Access to peers  +++ ++      
Testing & refining 
business model 
+++ −−− −     −− 
Help with team 
formation 
+++ ++  +++ +    
Direct funding from 
the programme 
++ +++   +++  +++ +++ 
Business skills 
development 
        
Press or media 
exposure 
 +++    +++   
Lab space or 
equipment 
        
Legal, financial, 
marketing or HR 
support 
+     −− − −− 
Help measuring 
social impact 
  ++     ++ 
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Dependent variable 
Perceiv
ed 
impact 
Emplo
yment 
growth 
Emplo
yees 
with a 
degre
e 
Deve
lopm
ent 
stage 
Inn
ova
tion 
Pat
enti
ng 
R&D 
(Log) 
Investme
nt raised 
Office space         
Coaching / personal 
development 
   −−     
Mentoring support         
Industry expert +    ++    
Entrepreneur (exited 
a venture) 
        
Entrepreneur (not 
exited) 
        
VC / angel  ++ +++      
Consultant, business 
developer 
 −−− −−  − +   
Mentoring intensity   +       ++      
 
Direct funding and help with team formation are positively associated with the 
greatest number of outcome measures 
When we turn to the relationship between accelerator support and objective outcomes, again 
using data obtained through our startup survey, we find that a small number of support types 
explain most of the variation in outcomes. As well as being associated with the perceived 
impact by participating startups, the provision of direct funding is associated with employment 
growth, innovation, R&D expenditure and additional investment. Direct funding had a 
particularly strong effect, relative to the other types of support, on innovation. This can likely be 
explained by part of this extra funding being spent on R&D (as indicated by the positive 
relationship between direct funding and R&D expenditure), resulting in the firm innovating 
more. 
Help with team formation is associated with a greater likelihood of advancing the startup’s 
development stage and its innovation output, as well as the perceived impact by startups. The 
effect of team formation on startup stage was considerably stronger than for any other support 
type. This is unsurprising since team formation itself is a major step in the development of a 
startup. 
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The types of support perceived to be important by startups are often not the 
same as those that are associated with startups success 
Not all support that is valued highly by startups is associated with startup success. Access to 
partners and customers, for example, is not related to any success metric tested in our models. 
Contrary to the positive impact perceived by startups, the effect of support in testing and 
refining the business model on growth and investment is negative. This can be explained, 
however, if accelerators help startups to discover a viable business model, which may involve 
rationalising and choosing between competing business models or developing new business 
models fundamentally different from the one at the time of acceptance into an accelerator.39 
Previous research has indeed found an increased likelihood of firm death as a result of 
attending an accelerator.  
An alternative explanation from a limited resource perspective is simply that any time spent on 
refining and testing business models cannot be spent on growth and investment. It is possible 
however, that while not captured at the point of data collection, this activity may have longer-
term effects.  
A number of support types are associated with success metrics but not with perceived impact 
of programmes, for example, access to investors is positively related not only to investment but 
also R&D spending and media exposure is linked to employment growth. Furthermore, while 
mentoring by venture capitalists or business angels is positively associated with growth 
outcomes, mentoring from consultants or business developers has a negative association on 
growth (employees and development stage) but a positive one with patenting. These effects 
suggest that networks and exposure provided by accelerators generally improve startups’ 
outcomes but need to be provided in a targeted way. Of some surprise is the finding that help 
measuring social impact has a positive effect on both the proportion of employees with a 
degree and investment raised, this may indicate that this type of support can help startups 
better tell their story and pitch both to skilled employees but also to investors. By contrast, 
access to peers and mentoring by venture capitalists or business angels are more directly 
related to growth without an effect on innovativeness.  
Mentoring from a consultant or business developer may help startups focus on 
their current ideas rather than expanding into new markets 
Our finding that mentoring from consultants or business developers has a negative relationship 
to employment growth but a positive one with patenting may suggest that consultants or 
business developers help startups focus and rationalise their business to maximise the market 
impact of existing ideas rather than develop entirely new products or services. A similar 
relationship was found with venture capitalists by (Lahr and Mina 2016), who attribute the 
positive relationship between venture capital on patenting to superior capabilities of venture 
capitalists to select investee firms with promising products in their early stages of patent 
applications. 
 
39 Accelerator participation increases the rate of exit by acquisition and exit by quitting in startups participating in 
programmes by Y Combinator and TechStars. Smith and Hannigan (2015) speculate that this is due to mentoring 
and peer influence. 
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Negative association between coaching and development stage may be the result 
self-selection by startups 
Since joining a programme, many startups advanced to the next stage in their life cycle while 
only a few reverted to an earlier stage (Figure 10).40 We find a negative relationship between 
coaching and development stage. One would not normally expect a detrimental effect of 
coaching or personal development on startup success. However, this negative effect may be 
explained by startups self-selecting into programmes that offer coaching if they perceive a 
need for personal development before they can advance their firm to the next stage of its 
development. Additional tests in a wider research setting could provide more insights into this 
hypothesised selection effect. 
Figure 10: Development stage transitions. The startup’s development stage at the time of its 
application to the accelerator is shown on the left, it’s development stage today on the right. 
Percentages are available in Appendix 5.10, Table A25. 
 
The intensity of R&D and patenting activity, and the likelihood of them being 
observed at all, are associated with different support types  
Results for patenting and R&D expenditures are sensitive to the measurement of the outcome 
variable. The intensity of a startups patenting activity is positively related to whether they 
received media exposure through a programme and whether a consultant mentored them, both 
of which are associated with an increase in patenting output of about 1.2 patents (Appendix 
5.10, Table A21). If we model patenting as a binary yes/no decision, two more variables 
significantly predict whether a startup patents: every doubling of mentoring intensity is 
associated with roughly a 5% increase in likelihood of patenting. Receiving administrative 
support, however, is associated with about a 15% decrease in the likelihood.41  
For R&D expenditures, results are similarly dependent on how the outcome is measured. 
Direct funding through the programme is important for both the amount of expenditure and 
whether the startup engages in R&D at all. However, the amount of R&D expenditure is also 
positively related to whether the startup receives access to investors through the programme 
 
40 Most firms are located on or above the diagonal in the stage transition matrix in Appendix 5.10 Table A25, 
which indicates progress along the life cycle of a firm. 
41 Also if patenting is modelled as a negative binomial process, access to investors and coaching improve 
outcomes while testing the business model, skills training and office space reduce patenting activities. 
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(positively). The likelihood of observing any positive R&D expenditure, however, increases with 
the availability of office space but decreases with the provision of lab space. The latter may be 
due startups being able to reduce R&D expenditures by using lab space provided free of 
charge, rather than reflecting less R&D activity. These findings suggest that there may be 
different sets of drivers at play for the intensity and likelihood of observing patenting and R&D. 
It is important to note here that it is not clear from this analysis which direction causality runs. 
For example, while the positive association between media exposure and patenting, discussed 
above, could be taken as evidence that by giving startups media exposure programmes 
increase their ability to patent, it is perhaps more plausible that instead those startups that are 
patenting go on to get media exposure through their programme because of these patents and 
the innovations they represent. 
Provision of physical space and equipment may be less important than other 
support types 
When looking at the overall effects of support types in Table 2, startups that have access to 
office space, or laboratory space or equipment do not seem to perform better than those that 
do not receive this type of support. This finding suggests that startups can obtain these 
resources relatively easily outside accelerators and incubators. While the provision of these 
resources, as such, does not suggest a competitive advantage of accelerators or incubators in 
providing them, the availability of space enables other benefits that are strongly related to a 
physical space such as interactions with other founders and entrepreneurs. 
There is not one specific mix of startup support that is positively related to 
multiple outcomes measures 
Do different types of incubators and accelerators have different effects on startups? The terms 
“incubator” and “accelerator”, hide the large amount of variation that exists within these 
models. Various classification systems have been developed over time (e.g. Allen and 
Mccluskey 1991; Grimaldi and Grandi 2005; von Zedtwitz and Grimaldi 2006; Becker and 
Gassmann 2006). These typologies distinguish different types of programmes based on 
several factors including: whether they are for-profit or non-profit, the type of parent 
organisation they are run by (e.g. property developer, venture capital, academic/university) or 
their purpose (e.g. ecosystem builder, deal-flow maker and welfare stimulator; Pauwels et al. 
2016; Clarysse et al. 2015). 
We want to understand the effect of programme type on their impact. Rather than impose a 
pre-conceived typology on our sample of programmes, we identify six different programme 
types by identifying commonalities in the support they offer (see Appendix 5.11 for analysis):  
• High-intensity support: frequent offer of all support and mentoring types 
• Accelerator-like: mix of all support types, but less intensive on team building, funding 
and mentoring 
• Mentoring-free: all support types with a focus on team building, but very limited 
mentoring 
• External exposure: medium support and light mentoring, focus on media and press 
exposure 
• Mentoring focus: light-touch support, but focus on mentoring by entrepreneurs, VCs and 
experts 
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• Incubator-like: coaching, skills, office and admin support, little external engagement 
As expected from our sampling strategy, a typical accelerator (class 2) is the most common 
class, with about 42% of respondents showing a moderately high likelihood of receiving a 
combination of all types of support. About 19% of respondent receive intensive support on all 
measures (class 1). A smaller but still substantial proportion of startups receive support that 
may be typical for incubators, with an emphasis on coaching and startup development but less 
on external engagement (class 6). The three least frequent combinations strongly vary in their 
mentoring content and external engagement and may reflect specialised programmes or 
startups requiring only limited support. 
When comparing “high-intensity support” programmes to the other five programme types we 
find significant effects (p<0.05) for only two outcomes: perceived impact and R&D 
expenditures. For the ‘external exposure’, ‘mentoring’ and ‘incubator-like’ programmes, the 
perceived impact of the programme is lower compared with the high-intensity type. For R&D 
expenditures, all programme types are inferior to the high-intensity type, except for ‘external 
exposure’ type; for which there is no significant difference. Surprisingly, however, none of the 
other outcomes are significantly related to any programme type, which suggests that there is 
not a generic recipe for startup support that improves success across a range of outcomes. 
The impact of different support types may be dependent on whether they are 
provided through an accelerator or an incubator model, however, the sample size 
used in this study is too small to draw firm conclusions  
As a robustness test, we estimate the impact of support for the subset of startups in 
programmes that we classify as accelerators. The relatively small number of startups in 
incubators prevents a separate analysis of these programmes. We can test, however, whether 
results change if we exclude incubated startups from the sample and rerun our analyses 
estimating the impact of startup support. 
Results for the accelerator-only sample retain most of the effects found for the full sample 
despite an expected loss of significance due to the reduced sample size (Appendix 5.10, Table 
A24). Moreover, some new effects are now significant, which suggests that startups attending 
accelerators are more similar to one another than other startups. Effects for direct funding and 
help with team formation in particular remain significant. Our model for the perceived impact of 
programmes on startups now also shows the positive association with access to investors, 
business skills development and mentoring by entrepreneurs. Similarly, access to partners is 
now positively associated with the development of startups. This suggests that while these 
things may not have a positive relationship in the setting of an incubator, in an accelerator they 
do. 
Some negative effects are more pronounced in the reduced sample. The provision of office 
space is now negatively associated with innovation, mentoring by an entrepreneur who has not 
exited a company yet has a negative relationship with the likelihood of advancing to the next 
development stage, and patenting performance is negatively associated with access to 
partners and customers. Some of these effects are difficult to reconcile with what we know 
about entrepreneurial processes but may be statistical artefacts caused by correlation among 
different types of startup support. To reliably distinguish effects and rule out spurious results, a 
larger sample would be needed. 
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3.5 Through which mechanisms does support have impact? A 
theory of change 
3.5.1 Methods 
Previous authors have pondered whether “[p]erhaps no general theory is possible because the 
causes and consequences of science parks and incubators may be idiosyncratic to their 
geographic locations, political and social contexts, and economic systems” (Phan et al. 2005). 
Whilst such contextual factors certainly make it difficult to determine what works for what types 
of firms, we believe that the evidence base is gradually building, thus enabling the construction 
of theoretical models of how incubators and accelerators achieve impact. 
Accelerators and incubators affect startups in numerous ways. Outcomes of such interactions 
manifest themselves sometimes immediately and sometimes only a considerable time after a 
startup has graduated from a programme. In this Section, we aim to investigate the pathways 
through which programmes may cause desirable outcomes for startups and society by 
combining our results on final outcomes above with additional analyses of intermediate 
outcomes.  
Our previous analyses used regression models to relate support provided by programmes 
directly to ultimate outcomes, treating the startup and its transformation while participating in a 
programme as a black box. To further investigate the mechanisms by which support may lead 
to ultimate outcomes, we again draw on data from our startup survey (see Section 3.21 for 
details) in which we asked startups whether they changed their way of doing business while 
participating in an accelerator or incubator programme. Changes in business practices explain 
a substantial proportion of the variation in productivity across firms and countries (McKenzie 
and Woodruff 2015). Whilst not necessarily desirable outcomes themselves, they may lead to 
beneficial outcomes later and can be visible much earlier, which provides for a closer link with 
startup support. In view of their position in the pathway between startup support and ultimate 
outcomes, we call these variables intermediate outcomes. To study potential pathways through 
which startup support affects outcomes, through a series of regression models, we first 
analyse which support types are associated with changes in intermediate outcomes. In the 
second step in our pathway analysis, we estimate how intermediate outcomes relate to 
ultimate outcomes. This stage helps to uncover potential mediators - variables in the pathway 
from startup support to ultimate startup success.  
3.5.2 Results 
The most common intermediate outcome related to accelerator or incubator 
participation involves startups changing their approach to strategic planning 
Figure 11 below illustrates the intermediate outcomes, measured by respondents’ answers to 
the question “Since applying to [programme name], to what extent have you changed your 
approach to: [intermediate outcome]”. For each intermediate outcome, the graph shows the 
proportion of startups for each degree of change. This figure shows that most change within 
startups, since participation, occurs at the strategic level. Marketing, product development and 
external relationships are viewed as important areas of change, whereas other common 
business functions, such as finance or human resources, are not as often the focus of change 
since participation in an accelerator or incubator programme. The small proportion of startups 
reporting a change in their decision of where to locate the business corroborates evidence 
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from the relatively small number of actual relocations of startups that we observe in our 
sample. 
Figure 11: Change in business practices  
 
While several support types are associated with at least one intermediate 
outcome, help with team formation is related to all that were measured 
Results from regression analyses suggest that if a programme offers help with team formation, 
startups report changes in a wide range of intermediate outcomes (Appendix 5.12, Table A28). 
This is not surprising as changes to the team of founders and early-stage employees often 
affects the business in dramatic ways, especially when startups are still in the process of 
defining their business model. Access to business partners and customers is related to 
changes in strategic planning and external partnerships, which again seems plausible given 
the knowledge transfer that typically occurs through close links with business partners. Among 
the support types with two or more strong links to intermediate outcomes, coaching and 
personal development is related to changes in strategic planning and marketing, as well as 
leadership and management, which suggests that personal training and support may help 
entrepreneurs to more effectively manage their business. Business skills development, 
however, has an insignificant or even negative effect on intermediate outcomes, in line with our 
findings for its effect on ultimate outcomes. 
Relatively few intermediate outcomes are associated with startup success, but of 
those that are, changes to how startups approach raising finance is related to the 
greatest number of ultimate outcomes 
The analysis suggests that relatively few intermediate outcomes are associated with improved 
outcomes for startups (Appendix 5.12, Table A29). Changes in the way in which startups raise 
finance are related to several desirable outcomes, and changes in recruiting practices is the 
only other variable with more than one significant effect (at p<0.05) on ultimate outcomes. 
Interestingly, several intermediate outcomes, such as changes in product development, 
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marketing, location decisions, or the adoption of digital technologies, are uncorrelated with 
ultimate outcomes at this level of analysis. These findings may be a reflection of large direct 
(unmediated) effects of startup support or hidden mediator variables that would need to be 
found if the pathways discovered in our analysis seem incomplete or not ideal for policy 
interventions. 
The two sets of analyses establishing pathways from a support measure to an intermediate 
outcome variable (Table A28) and pathways from intermediate to ultimate outcomes (Table 
A29) are useful to understand the processes by which startups become successful. A 
combined pathway from a support measure to an intermediate outcome to an ultimate outcome 
should only be taken as evidence of a mediated relationship if an overall effect of this support 
on the ultimate outcome can be found (omitting the intermediate outcome from the estimation). 
For example, our results suggest that access to partners and customers, coaching, and being 
mentored by an entrepreneur who has exited a business are associated with changes in 
strategic planning (Appendix 5.12, Table A28), while changes in strategic planning lead to 
greater perceived impact of accelerators (Appendix 5.12, Table A29). In our reduced-form 
analysis (Table 2), however, we find that of these support types only access to partners and 
customers has an overall effect on the perception of impact.  
While some types of support offered by programmes appear to be directly related 
to startup outcomes, others are mediated by changes in startup behaviour 
Formal mediation tests reveal that of the outcomes measured, the perceived impact of an 
accelerator or incubator by participating startups is associated with the widest range of 
intermediate outcomes (mediators; Figure 12). Most of these intermediate outcomes, such as 
changes in partnerships with external organisations or changes in strategic planning, mediate 
the effect of one support activity: help by the programme to build the startup’s team. This result 
underlines our earlier finding that team formation has the potential to fundamentally transform 
the business through multiple pathways.  
Several pathways appear to lead to increased innovation output. Changes in a startup’s 
approach to raising finance is typically accompanied by an increase in their innovativeness. 
External partnerships are similarly important to a startup’s innovation output, as is the decision 
where to locate the business. We observe greater reported success in raising finance if 
startups also report change their approach to raising finance and to managing cash flow.  
Finally, R&D expenditures are related mainly to a startup’s approach to raising finance, which 
suggests availability of finance as the underlying determinant of a successful R&D strategy. 
The two remaining key outcomes variables, employment growth and progress to the next 
development stage, are not associated with any of the changes in business practices we asked 
about. However, several support activities are directly related to startup success in these two 
dimensions, such as help with team formation, direct funding through the programme or 
access to peers (Table 2). 
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Figure 12: Pathways from support activities to startup success. Mediation relationships 
between startup support, changes in business practices and ultimate outcomes. We test 
whether the startup support variables act indirectly through the intermediate outcomes (i.e., 
potential mediators). The pathways shown are derived from individual mediation models 
testing one mediator and one support activity at a time (see Appendix 5.12, Table A28), in 
addition to variables already present in optimised models for the outcome variable and 
mediator (see Appendix 5.12, Table A29). The graph shows an arrow connecting treatment 
variables (startup support activities), intermediate outcomes and medium/long-term outcomes 
wherever an average mediation effect at a significance level of p < 0.1 and a total effect at the 
same level of significance can be found. Variables without significant mediated paths are 
shown without connecting pathways but may still have direct effects on medium/long-term 
outcomes. Colours of connecting paths indicate which support activities and intermediate 
outcomes are associated with each medium/long-term outcome.
 
The main limitation of this analysis is the large number of possible pathways relative to the 
number of startups in our sample. Correlations among support activities and among mediators 
may cause models to attribute the same effects to multiple support activities if these activities 
are highly correlated. For example, the positive relationship between help with team formation 
and perceived impact may act through any or all of the intermediate outcomes tested, but the 
analysis does not allow us to remove the spurious ones. With a substantially larger sample, 
most or all of the possible pathways could be tested simultaneously in a structural equations 
model.  
In summary, we find that startup support appears to act on ultimate startup success both 
directly and indirectly through intermediate outcomes. However, substantial indirect pathways 
can only be found for about half of the potential mediators and four out of the six ultimate 
outcomes we test. Access to direct funding through the programme and help with the formation 
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of the startup’s team appear to contribute to startup success through a variety of pathways. 
Other support types act more directly on desirable outcomes. Access to peers or coaching, for 
example, does not seem to be mediated but still have a considerable direct impact on outcome 
variables as demonstrated above. 
While most mediation effects are the same when accelerators are analysed 
separately from incubators, there are a few notable differences 
One might ask whether pathways are different if we study only startups that participate in an 
accelerator and remove all other startups from the sample. Results of this analysis are shown 
in Appendix 5.12, Figure A5. While most effects remain the same compared with the full-
sample analysis, including the positive relationship between access to funding, team formation 
and changes in financing and strategic planning practices, there are a few notable differences. 
On the outcome side of the equation, effects on employment growth are mediated by two 
business practices: raising finance and recruitment. We further identify one effect on startups’ 
development stage that is mediated by changes in cash flow management. Among mediator 
variables, the decision where to locate the business does not mediate any effects in the 
accelerator-only sample, but startups’ approach to adopting new digital technologies now 
mediates part of the effect of team formation on perceived impact.  
3.6 What is the impact of incubators and accelerators on the 
wider business ecosystem? 
3.6.1 Methods 
To explore the effect of accelerators on the wider business ecosystem, we estimated the effect 
of accelerators being launched on the amount of venture capital invested in that region. The 
main empirical challenge is the non-random launch of accelerators: these programmes are 
possibly founded in regions and periods with higher startup activity potential.  
We assemble a dataset with information on the dates when business accelerators launched 
across different regions (at the local authority level) in the UK. We focus on local authorities (as 
these approximate the likely range of influence of accelerators)42, and particularly on those 
local authorities outside of London, where the potential impact of accelerators in regional 
development is likely to be most meaningful. We also restrict the sample to local authorities 
whose first accelerator was launched prior to 2017 (in order to have at least one full year of 
data after the launch). The dataset is derived from the Directory of Accelerators created by 
Nesta in 2017.43 There are a total of 18 programmes that were founded in 17 local authorities 
in the UK between 2010 and 2016. We note that some of the local authorities in the list had 
more accelerators launched after the accelerators listed in the table. For the purpose of this 
exercise, we ignore these additional launches and focus only on the first year of arrival of an 
accelerator programme into the regions. 
We combine this dataset with information on venture capital fundraising for the same regions, 
in the years before and after the launch of accelerators. We then organise the dataset in “event 
time”, where each event refers to the year in which the first accelerator was launched in a 
 
42 The average land area of the 17 boroughs observed is 62 sq miles. However, as these include both cities and 
more rural areas, the size of varies quite a bit, from 29 sq miles (Nottingham City Council) to 223 sq miles (Vale of 
White Horse District Council). 
43 Appendix 5.13, Table A30 shows the names and locations of accelerator programmes in the sample. 
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particular region. For each local authority in the sample, we create an event-time variable τ 
indicating the number of years to/since the region’s first accelerator launch, and an indicator 
variable Post indicating the period after the region received its first accelerator   
Our analysis focuses on venture capital fundraising, obtained from Beauhurst,44 as a key 
outcome variable. First, we measure the number of distinct seed venture capital deals that 
occur each year in each local authority (number) separately for companies in the “high-tech” 
sector and in the “non-high-tech” sector.45 We make this distinction as accelerator portfolios 
concentrate in the high-tech sector (77% of the 5,284 accelerator portfolio companies in the 
Beauhurst data are classified by Beauhurst under this category). Second, we code the total 
sum of seed venture capital pounds invested each year at the local authority level (amount) 
separately for the high-tech and the non-high-tech sectors. Finally, we also adjust outcome 
variables to exclude observations for the accelerator portfolio companies. The resulting sample 
is a panel with observations at the local authority cross year cross sector level (i.e., high-tech 
and non-high-tech). 
We attempt to help separate the impact of accelerator formation from the endogenous 
selection of accelerators into “hot” regions for entrepreneurship, by exploiting the staggered 
formation of accelerators across regions, and the treatment focus of these programmes on the 
early-stage high-tech sector. In detail, for a given region, we compare changes in early-stage 
venture capital activity in the high-tech sector, relative to the non-high-tech sector, before and 
after the first accelerator launch. The staggered launch of accelerators across regions implies 
that the implicit control group are the local authorities that do not experience an accelerator 
launch in the same calendar year of accelerator formation, even if they have  already had their 
first accelerator launch or will have their first accelerator launch later on (see for example, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). We do not rely on synthetic controls (i.e., regions that did not 
have an accelerator launch during the sample period) for our estimation, as regions with and 
without accelerators differ substantially (Fehder and Hochberg, 2014). See Appendix 5.13 for 
further details about the approach taken and summary statistics. We do not control for any 
time-varying variables at the local authority level (e.g. startup activity), as most of these are 
outcomes of the accelerator formation event. Therefore, we cannot separate the effect of 
accelerator formation from the effect of other changes that occur at the same time as the 
accelerator formation but are not related to the event. The identification assumption is that the 
endogenous selection of accelerators across regions follows the general patterns in innovation 
opportunities for entrepreneurship, rather than systematically anticipates specific trends in the 
early-stage, high-tech sector, which is consistent with informal evidence on accelerator 
formation (cf. Fehder and Hochberg 2014). For the interpretation of results, it is important to 
note that any positive (negative) spillovers of the accelerator outside of high-tech will have the 
effect of dampening (biasing upwards) our estimates.  
 
44 Beauhurst is a searchable database of the UK’s high-growth companies: they track every company raising 
equity, graduating from an accelerator, receiving an innovation grant, spinning out from a university and more. 
45 High-tech includes companies working in the following sub-sectors: Clean energy generation, Energy reduction 
technology, Other CleanTech, Chips and processors, Consumer electronics hardware, Internet and networking 
hardware, Mobile and wireless hardware, Server hardware, Other hardware, Pharmaceuticals, Research tools / 
reagents, Materials technology, Clinical diagnostics, Medical devices, Medical instrumentation, Nanotechnology, 
Desktop software, Embedded software, Internet platform, Middleware, Mobile apps, Server software, Software-as-
a-service (SaaS), Other software, Other technology/IP-based businesses. Non-high-tech includes all others. 
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3.6.2 Results 
Accelerators have positive spillover effects on the wider business ecosystem 
After the first arrival of an accelerator to a UK local authority, the subsequent pattern of VC 
investments varies between firms in the high-tech sector and those in the non-high-tech sector. 
Figure 13 shows evidence of trend breaks in the number and value of seed investments by 
VCs in high-tech companies. Instead, no trend breaks are visible for seed investments by VCs 
in non-high-tech companies. Figure 13 plots the point estimates of simple event time 
regressions around the arrival of accelerators to UK local authorities during the 2010-2017 
period, which are estimated separately for the high-tech and the non-high-tech sector.  
We show that the relative trend breaks are statistically significant (p<0.05) using a regression 
model that compares the patterns of seed investments by VCs in high tech and in non-high-
tech around the first arrival of an accelerator to a UK local authority (Appendix 5.14, Table 
A32b). Our estimates imply that within 5 years of accelerator formation in a given region, an 
additional £48 million (26 deals) are invested in the high-tech industry, relative to the non-high-
tech industry. This corresponds to an estimated increase of 243%.46 Importantly, our results 
show that this increase in investment is not driven by investments going to accelerated firms. 
This suggests that, as was previously found by Fehder and Hochberg (2014) in the US, 
accelerators in the UK increase the exposure of non-accelerator companies to investors; as 
well as helping accelerated startups raise funding. Accelerators can help increase 
entrepreneurial activity in a region through different mechanisms, such as social events open 
to non-participants like weekly happy hours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
46 The average annual venture capital investment into a region is £2.79 million, which implies an average 
investment in a five year period of £14 million. Our estimate of £48 million corresponds to a 243% increase over 
this average. 
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Figure 13: Accelerator Formation and Early Stage Venture Capital Investments. The 
figure plots results from estimating equation (1) separately for high-tech (solid line) and non-
high-tech (dotted line) industries (see Appendix 5.13). 
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3.7. How do Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) interact with 
accelerators and incubators in their region, and can these 
interactions help both parties reach their objectives? 
3.7.1 Methods 
In order to explore the relationship between Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and 
accelerators and incubators in their regions, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 22 
out of the 38 LEPs in England. Care was taken to ensure that LEPs that were interviewed were 
geographically spread across the country. We asked interviewees questions about how they 
interact with programmes in their area, what the main barriers are to interaction, and how they 
could be supported to interact more effectively with accelerators and incubators. 
3.7.2 Results 
Below we summarise the key findings from interviews with 22 LEPs: 
LEPs interact frequently with publicly funded incubators and accelerators but 
less frequently with privately funded programmes 
Most LEPs we interviewed interact with incubators and accelerators on a regular basis, 
including by funding programmes or sharing staff as well as more informally such as by 
attending demo days and other events. However, interaction was much less common with 
privately funded programmes than those with university or other public funding.  
Several LEPs explicitly mention incubators and accelerators in their strategic economic plans 
within their local industrial strategies. One LEP has also gone as far as to launch their own 
technological accelerator brand and is forming plans to create an accelerator and incubator 
space, with funding from ERDF and the local Authority.47 
They would like to be given a bigger role in the strategic planning of incubators 
and accelerators in their regions 
It is felt by LEPs that there is often a lack of strategy from the ground up, with accelerators and 
incubators being set up in regions without much consultation with LEPs, who believe they can 
help avoid duplication of efforts and ensure new programmes meet the region's needs and 
ensure they fit in with the local industrial strategy e.g. by influencing sectoral focus and design 
of programmes. 
LEPs see challenges around the uncertainty in the sustainability of programmes, 
the lack of support for later stage businesses and how programmes might be 
funded if/when EU funding is withdrawn 
Uncertainty about the sustainability of current incubator and accelerator programmes is seen to 
be a major challenge by LEPs. There was also a concern that while accelerators and 
incubators provide support to early stage businesses there is a lack of flexible workspace and 
support for later stage scaling firms. Finally, many incubators and accelerators are EU funded 
which raised questions about how these programmes will be funded if/when this money is 
 
47 Worcestershire’s LEPs BetaDen accelerator. 
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withdrawn following Brexit. In particular LEPs want to understand the extent to which the UK 
Shared Prosperity Fund will replace this funding. 
There is a strong desire to learn from other LEPs 
Most of the interviewees report a strong desire to learn from other LEPs either through online 
reports and case studies or through opportunities to connect directly with other LEPs to share 
experiences and best practices in running and working with accelerators and incubators. In 
order for this to happen interviewees report a need for more resources devoted to cross LEP 
working, noting that Growth Hub meetings, which are supposed to meet this need, have 
become very irregular.  
3.8 What barriers do accelerators and incubators face in 
maximising their impact and what can be done to overcome 
these? 
3.8.1 Methods 
In our survey of incubators and accelerators (see Section 3.11 for details about the survey), we 
asked about the barriers they faced to having a greater impact.  
3.8.2 Results 
Incubators and accelerators see the cost of financing programmes as the biggest 
barrier to having more impact 
The only barrier that is consistently reported to be restricting their impact to a great or very 
great extent is the cost of financing the programme (37% of programme managers; Figure 14); 
this barrier was experienced particularly extensively by accelerators.  
This is acutely felt by London-based programmes, with 47% of them regarding cost of finance 
as a barrier to a great or very great extent. Furthermore, 21% of programmes in London report 
the cost of suitable premises to be a barrier, above the 12% average for all programmes. It is 
perhaps unsurprising due to the general costs of operating in London, including how staff 
wages will be higher.  
Availability of quality ventures and availability or cost of suitable premises is 
also seen as being a large barrier to accelerators 
Accelerators also report availability of quality ventures and availability or cost of suitable 
premises as restricting their impact to a great or very great extent considerably more often than 
incubators do. The availability of quality ventures is likely to have a larger impact on 
accelerators than incubators because of the faster turnaround time of these programmes 
meaning that they more often are having to recruit new ventures. The availability or cost of 
suitable premises is perhaps harder to explain, but may be due to the fact that accelerators are 
more often located in the centre of large cities (particularly London), rather than in out-of-town 
science parks or university campuses. 
Other barriers such as the availability of other qualified personnel, unwillingness or inability of 
entrepreneurs/ventures to commit sufficient time to programme, regulations/red tape/ taxation, 
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availability of quality mentors and unwillingness of entrepreneurs/ventures to incorporate 
feedback are also mentioned by both accelerators and incubators but are less common. 
Figure 14: Barriers to impact (% reporting a ‘great’ or ‘very great’ restriction on impact)  
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4. Conclusions and discussion 
4.1 Summary of findings 
This study shows, through a survey of startups, that in general incubator and accelerator 
participants view these programmes as having a positive effect on their success. Participating 
startups perceive incubators as being slightly more important to their success than 
accelerators, though this perceived difference between incubators and accelerators may reflect 
the larger time commitment with the former – the average residency of an incubator being two 
years, compared with around six months for the average accelerator programme. 
Enquiring about startups’ perceptions of programmes is not, however, a robust method of 
judging their impact. In order to produce more robust evidence of the possible impact of 
support programmes, we examined startups from a notable corporate accelerator that provided 
participants with various elements of entrepreneurship schooling but no cash. We used a 
regression discontinuity design to compare firms that were just above and just below the 
threshold for being interviewed to compete for a position in the programme. Our main 
assumption is that firms ranking closely to either side of the interview threshold face similar 
innovation opportunities. The results from this analysis provide compelling evidence that the 
programme in question had a positive impact on survival, employee growth and funds raised. 
Moreover, since the corporate accelerator provided no funding to participants, the results point 
specifically to the provision of non-monetary services as a particular pathway to accelerators’ 
impact, which is consistent with the results in prior academic work (Gonzalez-Uribe and 
Leatherbee, 2017; Gonzalez-Uribe and Reyes, 2019).  
The findings from this study cannot be uncritically extrapolated to all programmes, since we 
know not only that programmes can vary significantly in terms of their content and methods, 
but also that the local context (such as university affiliation or competitiveness of the local 
business environment) seems to have a significant impact. Nevertheless, the regression 
discontinuity design robustly confirms that it is possible for accelerator programmes to have a 
significant positive impact on the startups that they support.  
Because this method could not be extended to a broader set of programmes, we used data 
from a survey of startups that had participated in any UK accelerators or incubator to 
determine how such programmes add value to startups (i.e. which types of support make the 
biggest difference to startup success and by what mechanisms). Answering these questions 
for the general case is complicated by the variety of programmes, offering a wide range of 
support services and with a broad range of objectives, which are difficult to neatly distil into a 
small number of archetypes. Moreover, the pathways to impact are many, both direct and 
indirect. However, by looking at a relatively broad sample of startups and different 
programmes, we attempted to identify and analyse common factors – albeit less robustly than 
with the narrower regression discontinuity design. 
Our broader study finds that most types of support are positively associated with at least one 
outcome measure, but that few interventions could be positively linked with multiple outcomes. 
This reinforces that programmes need to prioritise their goals and tailor their design to desired 
outcomes. For example, a programme focussed on employment growth will likely require 
different interventions than one focussed on improving R&D intensity in startups. 
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Drilling into specific factors, in this broader study we found evidence that (i) direct funding 
through a programme and (ii) help with team formation both had a positive relationship with 
several outcome measures. These results complement those from the regression discontinuity 
design on the positive impact of the provision of non-monetary services on startup 
performance. In our view, these types of support are thus most likely to contribute to startup 
success. 
We also found evidence in support of the existing literature (e.g.  Schwartz 2013; Yu 2018) 
suggesting that incubators and accelerators help startups evaluate their business models, 
which leads to slower (more cautious) growth and a higher failure rate for incubated and 
accelerated startups that received help in developing their business model. In our results, 
startups that receive help in testing and refining their business model rate the programme’s 
impact more highly and, at the same time, show slower growth and a diminished likelihood of 
receiving additional funding. As suggested earlier, this may be beneficial since helping poor 
ideas to fail faster ultimately improves the efficient allocation of resources. It also underscores 
why business survival rates alone should be interpreted cautiously as a success metric for a 
programme. 
Perhaps surprisingly, we found no evidence for the provision of office space, lab space or 
equipment having an impact on startup outcomes. While it is possible that physical space is 
required to ensure interaction of peers, anecdotal evidence from startups’ comments at our 
roundtable events indicate that many founders prefer to work at home than in an accelerator or 
incubator space. This raises the question about whether the support types for which we did 
find a positive impact might be provided more cost-effectively via remote, ‘virtual’ programmes. 
Such virtual programmes may also have the benefit of helping new businesses in areas of the 
country which currently have less physical support infrastructure – although they may not 
deliver the same ecosystem benefits.    
In terms of spillovers and wider ecosystem impact, we found that accelerators can have a 
positive impact in attracting investment to non-accelerated as well as accelerated firms – 
although further work may be needed to understand the precise mechanisms that are driving 
this increase in investment, and whether this is genuinely additional or displacement from 
adjacent regions. (Additionally, since many spillovers seem to arise from physical proximity, it 
seems possible that ‘virtual’ accelerators might be more cost-effective in supporting individual 
startups, but much less effective in delivering wider ecosystem benefit). Due to a lack of 
suitable data, we were regrettably unable to offer a similar conclusion for incubators, so further 
research is also needed to clarify whether such an ‘investment attraction effect’ exists for 
incubators, as well as the potential of all programme types in creating other (non-investment) 
spillovers. 
4.2 Limitations of the study   
A significant limitation in this study was that, due to a paucity of (or for some analyses, 
complete lack of) data on incubators and their participants, we were unable to robustly 
compare differences in the impact of incubators to that of accelerators. While accelerators and 
incubators offer similar types of support, the time spans over which support is delivered is 
typically quite different, the average time spent in an incubator is around 2 years, compared to 
around 6 months for an accelerator. Since incubators typically provide support less intensively 
but over longer periods of time than accelerators, it may be the case that certain types of 
support may be more – or less – effective in this context.  
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Similarly, while some types of startup may benefit more from support given over a short but 
intense period others may be more suited to support being provided over a longer time period. 
Indeed, responses to open-ended questions in our startup survey provided some evidence that 
startups often desire a more long-term view of their development than is currently possible in 
the programmes in which they participated. The stronger emphasis on long-term development 
provided by incubators may therefore be a better fit for some types of business.  
A related limitation of our data is that we were unable to explore how long the positive impacts 
of attending a programme last for, i.e. we did not compare the short-term versus the longer-
term effects of participation. For example, in our RDD analysis exploring the impact of one 
corporate accelerator, all startups had applied to the accelerator within the last 5 years but we 
did not have a large enough data sample to differentiate the impact experienced by those that 
applied 1 year ago from those that applied 5 years ago.  
We faced a similar problem when using our startup survey data to explore the relative impact 
of different types of support. In this case we experienced the added issue that although we 
know approximately when startups in our sample joined an accelerator or incubator, we do not 
know how long they took part in the programme for (i.e. when they graduated), so we cannot 
tell how long they received support for and also how long it has been since they stopped 
receiving support. In order to answer this question, future work could follow the progression of 
a panel of startups from the time they apply to a programme until a few years after they 
graduate allowing a more in-depth longitudinal analysis. 
Concerning other limitations of the study and opportunities for further research, we have not 
examined the cost-effectiveness of accelerators and incubators, return on investment or the 
sustainability of the business models of incubation programmes – nor compared these with 
other potential forms of startup support. The study which preceded this report (Bone et al. 
2017) discussed growing concerns about the financial sustainability of programmes, especially 
in view of often unclear goals and success metrics. This research does not allay those 
concerns. 
A further limitation of the research is that our modelling of different types of incubation support 
did not account for possible self-selection (sorting) effects. If startups self-select into certain 
types of accelerators based on their own needs and the accelerator’s characteristics (e.g. 
types of support offered), this may lead to biased results. In our experience this is not the case; 
entrepreneurs typically based their choice on a variety of factors including overall quality, 
location, and sector verticals. However, we would expect selection effects to become more 
pronounced as entrepreneurs’ understanding of programmes’ fit with their needs becomes 
more sophisticated, perhaps aided by tools to allow startups to identify their own weaknesses 
and to compare the differences between programmes. Further research should therefore bear 
this in mind. 
An additional limitation of the study is that, whilst the regression discontinuity design helped 
eliminate the problem of the selection effect, it was not possible to disentangle how much of 
the positive impact we found was due to signalling (certification) effects. We recommend that 
future work tries to understand the importance of this (though we acknowledge that this is not 
simple: even within education, where the datasets are vastly richer, the role of signalling 
remains much disputed). 
This study mirrors past work in finding that the optimum design of a programme is likely to be 
highly context-dependent (such as in terms of size, sector and location of the startup). Given 
that this is so, it is understandable that there may be doubts about whether the evidence of 
impact from incubation programmes elsewhere can be applied to programmes in the UK 
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context. However, this study adds to the growing evidence base that incubators and 
accelerators can have a positive impact, not only on the startups they support but also on the 
wider ecosystem in which they are situated.  
4.3 Recommendations 
4.3.1 For public funders 
Invest in pilot programmes and further research to understand good practice, 
displacement effect (including any other ecosystem effects), and longevity of 
impact  
The evidence for the effectiveness of incubators and accelerators suggests that they could be 
a useful tool for driving regional economic development. The evidence for spillover benefits of 
accelerators (into non-participating startups) provided by this study strengthens the policy 
argument in favour of public support. However, we suggest that, before committing long-term 
funding into such programmes, public funders should invest in further research to understand 
good practice, the extent to which ecosystem-level benefits might be the result of displacement 
from neighbouring areas, and the time span over which incubators and accelerators have a 
positive impact. This research could follow an experimental approach, investing in and 
evaluating pilot programmes.48 
Continue to investigate other types of intervention alongside incubators and 
accelerators 
Whilst this study suggests that incubators and accelerators can be part of a toolbox of possible 
interventions which aim to boost innovation and entrepreneurship, it does not evaluate the 
relative cost-effectiveness of different interventions. Therefore, we do not know whether 
investing in these programmes is the most efficient use of public money or how this type of 
support compares with other potential interventions, such as tax credits, direct grants or 
network building. We suggest that public funders should continue to investigate other types of 
support alongside incubators and accelerators in order to understand their relative cost-
effectiveness. 
Make data-sharing obligatory for incubators and accelerators receiving public 
funding 
The lack of publicly-reported data on startup outcomes from accelerators and incubators was a 
significant inhibitor for this study, as it has been for other research in this field. It is the authors’ 
view that more could be done to encourage incubators and accelerators to share data and to 
report outcomes. This is especially true if the programmes concerned are in receipt of public 
funding, in which case we suggest that making such data available should be an essential 
criteria for programmes receiving funds. Though we acknowledge that this may be difficult to 
enforce. 
 
48 See Nesta and it’s Innovation Growth Labs’s (IGL) work on for more information about experimentation:  
https://www.nesta.org.uk/feature/innovation-methods/experiments-and-trials/ 
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4.3.2 For programmes 
Assess your own impact or share data with researchers to do it for you and use 
data-driven insights to optimise your programme design 
It is clear from this and other studies that not all programmes are equal and that offering 
certain types of support has a larger impact than others. However, there is still a lot of 
uncertainty around the effect of sector, location and other factors on optimum programme 
design. Incubators and accelerators could do more to assess their own impact and test what 
programme designs work best in their context. If they do not have the capacity to conduct 
these analyse in house, there are many academic and think tank researchers in the UK which 
would be eager to conduct research in partnership with programmes if given access to their 
data. Assessing the impact of your programme can help you demonstrate your value to 
funders as well as help you optimise the design of your programme to maximise your 
effectiveness. 
4.3.3 For Local Enterprise Partnerships  
Understand how incubators and accelerators can be part of your Local Industrial 
Strategy and connect with other LEPs in order to share experiences and best 
practices 
While our research has found that some LEPs are already including incubators and 
accelerators in their Local Industrial Strategies, we would encourage LEPs which are not 
already doing so to also consider the potential value of including incubators and accelerators. 
LEPs that we spoke to also reported a strong desire to connect with other LEPs in order to 
share experiences and best practices in working with incubators and accelerators. We believe 
that there is a role that pre-existing networks working in this space (e.g. The LEP Network or 
The Centre for Entrepreneurs Incubator and Accelerator Network) to coordinate such 
networking and knowledge sharing opportunities.  
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5. Appendices 
Appendix 5.1 Extended Literature review 
5.5.1 Impact on overall outcomes of participating startups 
Impact of accelerators 
Beginning with studies that specifically explore the impact of incubators on participating 
startups, in the fluid space of support structures for technology firms, one of the early studies 
investigates science parks in the UK that were established with government help in 
collaboration with universities mainly in the 1970s and 1980s in an effort to encourage R&D 
and innovation in small and medium-sized firms. A 1997 study by Westhead compares on-park 
and off-park firms and finds no statistically detectable effect of science parks on input or output 
measures of innovation, including R&D expenditures, percentage of qualified scientists and 
engineers, innovation diffusion and the survival of tenant firms (Westhead 1997). Westhead 
and co-authors later reviewed the developing literature on science parks and concluded that 
the returns to being located in a science park seem negligible (Siegel, Westhead, and Wright 
2003). They speculate that imprecise estimates may be due to differences in the types of 
science parks, their ownership and the types of services provided to firms. 
Colombo and Delmastro (2002a) compared a group of new technology based firms that had 
resided in an Italian incubator to a matched control group of similar firms that had not 
participated in an incubator. They found evidence suggesting that the incubator had a positive 
impact on employee growth but no effect on innovation, as measured by R&D intensity.49 A 
possible shortcoming of this study is that it only considered surviving firms and therefore failed 
to account for how survival affects growth rates.  
Schwartz (2013) compared the survival rates of residents of five German incubators to a 
control group of similar but non-incubated business. They found that for three of the five 
incubators, participating firms were actually less likely to survive for ten or more years than 
those in the control group. The other two incubators had no significant effect on firm survival. 
While decreasing survival rates may appear to suggest that these incubators have a negative 
impact on the startups they support, this may not necessarily be the case. Rather, it may 
indicate that these incubators help firms understand the viability (or unviability) of their idea, 
resulting in them killing bad business ideas sooner than they otherwise would; and thus 
preventing time and money being wasted on businesses that were doomed from the get-go.  
Effects on survival extend beyond the time that firms spend at incubators. On graduation from 
an incubator, firms experience an elevated risk of closure that lasts up to 3 years after leaving 
the incubator (Schwartz 2009). It may be interpreted as an indication of the positive effects of 
incubator support if the discontinuation of low rents, shared facilities, management support or 
access to business networks has an immediate negative effect on subsequent survivability. 
Equally, however, it may suggest that such programmes can end up serving as ‘life support’ for 
firms, which is almost never the desired policy goal. 
While the method of matching similar incubated firms with non-incubated firms – as used by 
Schwartz (2013) and Colombo and Delmastro (2002) – attempts to take into account the 
selectivity of incubators, it is not clear whether the characteristics used to conduct this 
 
49 Measured by the ratio of R&D expenses to sales, of tenant firms. 
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matching adequately represent those that contribute to firm success in the selection process. 
Colombo and Delmastro (2002), for example, use firms’ location, industry, age, and legal form 
to perform matching of firms but later find evidence that incubators attract firms with better-
than-average human capital, as measured by educational attainments and prior working 
experience. It may therefore be the better human capital of incubated firms that causes any 
observed differences between incubated and non-incubated firms. 
Another method that has been used to test the effect of incubators is to look at the effect the 
amount of time spent in an incubator has on outcomes for firms. Rothaermel and Thursby 
(2005b) asked this question of firms attending the Georgia Institute of Technology incubator in 
the US. The authors found that the length of time spent in the incubator had a positive effect on 
firm survival but a negative impact on the probability of them graduating from the incubator. 
Here graduating means that the startup leaves the incubator and operates as a stand-alone 
going concern or is acquired. This suggests that while the incubator may have protected firms 
from failure, it simultaneously prevented them from growing or developing much further.  
A related paper by the same authors also found that firms that remain longer within an 
incubator may be less likely to raise VC funds but more likely to generate significantly higher 
revenues (Rothaermel and Thursby 2005a). This illustrates some of the tensions that are 
apparent, and the need to define success criteria before one can determine performance. 
Impact of accelerators 
The evidence for the impact of accelerators is a little stronger than that for incubators. One way 
in which researchers have tried to assess the impact of accelerators is simply to ask 
participating startups. In order to understand how much value accelerated startups think 
accelerators added to their business, Christensen (2014) asked 51 accelerated startups “If the 
accelerator provided no funding to your company at all, how much equity would you give them 
just to go through the program?” While 21% of the startups reported they would allocate no 
equity, suggesting they saw no value in the accelerator they attended, 55% reported they 
would allocate between 1% and 6% equity, even without funding, implying that in general 
participating startups believe that accelerators are adding value in excess of the funding they 
give.  
Using a more quantitative methodology, Roberts et al. (2016) compared the performance 
changes of firms that participated in one of fifteen accelerators around the world50 to firms that 
applied to but were rejected from these programmes. Comparing firms accepted by the 
programme to rejected ones allows the authors to control for the effect of self-selection by 
firms into a programme (i.e., the decision to apply) but does not control for the selectivity of the 
accelerator programmes. They found that accelerated firms had higher revenue growth and 
investment growth, but that there was no effect on employee growth.  
Hallen et al. (2016), at least partially take into account the effect of accelerator selectivity by 
comparing a sample of US-based accelerator participants with those “almost accepted” to the 
same cohorts. The authors found that most of the studied accelerators had a positive impact 
on the speed with which firms raised funds or gained customer traction (as measured by web 
traffic). A smaller number of accelerators increased the speed of startups being acquired. It is 
worth noting that the five accelerators involved in this study were all ‘top tier’ accelerators, and 
so it is not clear whether these findings can be generalised to the entire accelerator population. 
 
50 Accelerators were all run by Village Capital and were based in the U.S, India, Mexico, South Africa, 
Netherlands and Kenya. 
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In a study assessing the impact of the Startup Chile accelerator, Gonzalez-Uribe and 
Leatherbee (2016) showed that the programme’s entrepreneurship school (which includes 
several services other than business instruction, such as increased visibility) affects 
employment and scale, whereas the basic services of funding and coworking space on their 
own have no apparent effect on venture performance. To assess the impact of the basic 
services (entrepreneurship school), the authors compare the performance of the Startup Chile 
(school) participants with that of rejected applicants. They robustly take into account the 
accelerator’s selectivity in both sorting participants to the accelerator and to the 
entrepreneurship school, by controlling for differences in quality among applicants using the 
numerical scores given to firms by judges when applying to the accelerator and when applying 
to the entrepreneurship school, and by exploiting the programmes’ predetermined, fixed 
capacity threshold to the general programme and fixed quality threshold to the school. 
When comparing the outcomes of participants of two top US accelerators to a matched group 
of angel-funded counterparts, Smith and Hannigan (2015) found that accelerated firms have 
lower survival rates than angel-funded firms, mirroring what Schwartz (2013) found for 
incubators. However, they also found that accelerated firms are more likely to be acquired than 
their non-accelerated counterparts. This suggests that accelerators can help bad ideas or 
businesses “fail faster”, while helping better ideas to find investment. Smith & Hannigan (2015) 
put this down to the existence of ‘demo days’, suggesting that while these give startups the 
opportunity to pitch to investors, if they do not manage to obtain investment on this day, their 
likelihood of failure is high. 
Similarly, Yu (2016) finds that firms that have been through an accelerator raise less money 
and have lower survival rates than a matched group of non-accelerated firms. Yu (2016) 
proposes that this is a result of entrepreneurs with the best ideas not applying for accelerators 
as they do not want to dilute their equity. Rather, accelerators, she argues, attract startups that 
are less certain about the viability of their idea and that the intense feedback that participants 
receive from accelerator staff, mentors and other participating startups helps them to more 
accurately assess their viability. As discussed above, this indicates that accelerators can help 
bad ideas fail faster. 
Alongside studies that have specifically tested the impact of incubators or accelerators impact, 
several have conflated the two models.51 Lasrado et al. (2016), for example, found that firms 
that have been through an incubator or accelerator have more employees and sales revenue 
than firms that have not participated in a programme.52 In addition, the study finds that 
university affiliated programmes are associated with faster sales and job growth than those not 
connected to a university. Conversely, another study by Amezcua (2010) also looked at the 
effect of whether or not incubators and accelerators are affiliated with a university, and finds 
that while university affiliation has a positive effect on firm survival, it has no effect on 
employment or revenue growth of participating firms. 
5.5.2 The effect of programme design on impact 
At the level of an incubator’s overall mission, some effects have been observed on the rate of 
survival of tenant firms in European incubators. If an incubator’s self-declared purpose includes 
“stimulating entrepreneurial spirit” or “supporting SMEs”, its tenant failure rate during the firms’ 
stay at the incubator decreases (Aerts et al. 2007). By contrast, mission statements including 
 
51 Conflated according to our working definitions, but definitions in the literature are diverse and sometimes 
overlap. 
52 Stokan et al. 2015 also finds that accelerated or incubated firms have more employees than firms that have not 
been through a programme 
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“contributing to competitiveness of local economy” and “supporting specific sectors” have no 
effect on tenant survival.  
Employment growth in relation to incubator support was studied by Pena (2004) in a sample of 
114 startups that all attended the same incubator programme in the Basque Country. Business 
education programmes and assistance services collectively improved employment in startups, 
whereas the effects of savings (from the use of subsidised space and equipment), networking 
and exchange activities with other tenants and external contacts facilitated by incubator (e.g., 
investors, local authorities) remained statistically negligible. None of the support services 
studied had a detectable effect on profits or sales. 
Hallen et al. (2014) suggested that the increased speed with which firms raised funds or 
gained customer traction which they observed in incubated and accelerated firms may be 
explained by what they describe as “broad, intense, and paced (BIP) consultation”. They 
describe BIP as knowledge sharing that relies on the direct sharing of experiences which are 
then translated to the startup’s own situation. They suggest that in incubators and accelerators 
BIP consultation takes place through mentoring with domain experts, interviews with 
customers, private meetings with programme directors, weekly check-ins with other 
participating startups, and discussions with seminar speakers.  
These hypothesised effects of non-monetary services receive some support in a study by 
Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee (2016). They test the effect of startups receiving 
entrepreneurship schooling on top of the basic support package (cash and coworking space) 
offered by the Startup Chile accelerator and found that schooled startups appeared to hire 
more and grow their customer base faster than non-mentored participants.  
In a study further focusing on the potential impact of non-monetary services of accelerators, 
Gonzalez-Uribe and Reyes (2019) exploit the random assignment of applicants to application 
judges with different tendencies to award high scores. They find that the entrepreneurship 
schooling provided by the ValleE ecosystem accelerator in Colombia (in the form of 
bootcamps, mentoring and visibility) impacts revenue, employment and profits, even though 
the accelerator provides no funding. Gonzalez-Uribe et al. (2018) find similar results for one of 
the largest corporate accelerators worldwide, which provides no seed funding, but provides 
participants with business training, advice and access to the corporate sponsor’s servers and 
software. 
The optimum programme design appears to depend on how competitive the environment is in 
which the programme is active. Amezcua et al. (2013) find that for firms operating in a 
competitive business environment,53 participating in an incubator or accelerator that offers 
networking and management training produces firms with higher survival rates; however, for 
those working in less competitive environments networking appears to have a negative effect 
on survival and management training has no effect on survival. This suggests that 
management training and networking — by facilitating exchanges of resources, knowledge or 
more formal collaboration — can give firms a competitive advantage. This same study found 
that for startups operating in a non-competitive environment, attending a programme that 
focuses on supporting startups from a particular sector leads to a higher likelihood of survival 
in comparison to attending a non-specialised programme; however, the opposite was true for 
startups operating in a more competitive environment. A potential explanation for this is that as 
a sector becomes denser, competition over funding and customers begins to outweigh the 
 
53 As measured by the number of organisations in the same sector at the county level in the organisation's 
founding year. 
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increased level of knowledge and resource sharing, and collaboration opportunities that come 
with working alongside other business in the same sector as yourself. 
Even when asking startups directly about which types of support they value the most the 
results are mixed. When asked, startups reported finding mentoring, coaching and feedback 
alongside network, alumni and prestige to be the most valuable aspect of the accelerator 
programme they attended (Christiansen 2014). The same startups reported finding direct 
investment from the accelerator and connections to investors to be less useful. However, 
another study that asked a similar question found that while networking opportunities were 
highly valued by startups, access to funding (direct and indirect) was also highly valued but 
skills development, awareness and credibility and gaining access to a group of like-minded 
entrepreneurs was not seen to be as useful Roberts et al. (2016).  
5.5.3 The effect of incubators and accelerators on the broader business 
ecosystem  
Anecdotally, incubators and accelerators often serve as ‘focal points’ for an ecosystem, 
providing not only a degree of deliberate coordination but also a geographic locus which 
increases the chance of serendipitous interactions. Do studies support this notion? 
One study commissioned by BEIS looked into the outcomes for businesses located in 
incubators as well as those located within the areas surrounding incubators (Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2019). This study had a particular focus on 
understanding whether the presence of incubators or science parks might displace economic 
activity from their surrounding areas. The authors found that being located on an incubator site 
was associated with increased employee growth, turnover growth and productivity growth54 
and that there was no observed displacement effect for the surrounding area. Furthermore, it 
was found that the presence of an incubator was associated with increased growth in 
normalised wages (i.e. average of wages relative to average wages in a specific sector and 
occupation) within two to three kilometres around incubator sites and increased high level 
occupational change up to four kilometres around incubator sites. Taken together, these 
results suggest that incubators can help promote the creation of high-quality jobs in their wider 
ecosystem (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2019).  
Accelerators may also affect the availability of finance in a region. In their study of US census 
regions, Fehder and Hochberg (2014) tested the effect of the launch of an accelerator on the 
availability of venture capital funding in the region that the accelerator is located. They found 
that the launch of an accelerator was associated with an increase in the number of VC deals 
and the total amount invested in the region. Importantly, much of the increase in funding 
events involved non-accelerated companies. This suggests that by attracting VCs with 
activities such as mentorship and demo days, accelerators simultaneously increase the 
exposure of non-accelerated firms nearby. 
 
54 As measured by the number of organisations in the same sector at the county level in the organisation's 
founding year. 
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Appendix 5.2 Focus group agenda / topic guides 
5.5.1 Focus group with incubators / accelerator managers 
Introduction to the roundtable and our research - Jonathan Bone / Chris Haley (10 
minutes) 
Introductions around the table (2 minute each; 20 mins max) 
Participants introduce themselves, their accelerator/incubator and tell us what their 
accelerators/incubators goals are, and how they support startups 
Selection of startups (10 minutes) 
What do you look for in the startups you choose? 
What is the application process? 
Do you score startups that apply in a consistent way? 
Are you able to share data on startups that were accepted / not-accepted and the score you 
gave them? 
Accelerator/incubator impact (10 minutes) 
What would success look like to you? 
Large exits, increased jobs in your region, change in attitudes towards entrepreneurship, better 
links between startups and academia etc.  
What do you do to measure the impact of your accelerator? 
What measurements do you use, do you have a control group etc. 
If you don’t look at impact, so you collect data on startups for other reasons? 
Environmental constraints (10 minutes) 
What barriers to achieving greater impact on startups do you encounter (e.g. not enough 
applicants, finance, skilled people, uncertain market demand, etc.)? 
How do you interact with other elements of your ecosystem? (10 minutes) 
How do you think this benefits your incubator/accelerator and the startups you support? 
What challenges do you face in working together? (e.g. do you compete? is there duplication 
of efforts?) 
Government support (10 minutes) 
Are you publicly funded? 
What support, if any, does your incubator/accelerator get from government? 
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Feedback on Survey design (give them 10 minutes to look at questions; then 15 minutes to 
give feedback) 
Do the options we give as answers make sense, should we add any? 
Is there and questions that should be reworded / removed 
Should we add anything? 
What would incentivise you to take the survey / provide data? Is it enough that the report will 
give you a benchmark? 
Anything else people would like to discuss (10 minutes) 
Debrief and thank you (5 minutes) 
 
5.5.2 Focus group with incubator / accelerator participant firms 
Introduction to the roundtable and our research - Jonathan Bone / Chris Haley (10 
minutes) 
Introductions around the table (2 minute each; 20 mins max) 
Participants introduce themselves, their startup, the incubator/accelerator they participated in 
and why they wanted to join an incubator/accelerator 
What made you decide to choose that incubator/accelerator over all the others? (10 
minutes) 
What barriers were you facing and how did the accelerator/incubator help you overcome 
these aspect of your experience? (10 minutes) 
What was the most useful and least useful aspect of the incubator/accelerator you 
attended? (10 minutes) 
Do you track your startups progress? (10 minutes) 
What metrics do you use to assess your company? (e.g. Revenue growth, Investment, 
Customer traction etc.) 
Is this data you would be willing to share? 
What challenges do you face in measuring/tracking your progress? 
Was there a noticeable increase in progress since being part of the programme? 
Government support (10 mins) 
Have you benefited from any government support (e.g. tax relief)? 
What do you think the role of government should be in the startup ecosystem? 
What other startup support have you received? (10 minutes) 
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Have you previously, or since being part of another incubator or accelerator 
Have you used coworking spaces, received VC investment etc.? 
How did the accelerator/incubator programme compare? (e.g. did the VC help you in other 
ways? Did you feel there was duplication of efforts etc.?) 
Feedback on Survey design (give them 10 minutes to look at questions; then 15 minutes 
to give feedback) 
Do the options we give as answers make sense, should we add any? 
Is there and questions that should be reworded / removed 
Should we add anything? 
What would incentivise you to take the survey / provide data? Is it enough that the report will 
give you a benchmark? 
Anything else people would like to discuss (10 minutes) 
Debrief and thank you (5 minutes) 
Appendix 5.3. Supplementary information on startup survey 
respondents 
Most startups are currently active (424), while a minority is pre-formation (5), dormant (4), has 
ceased trading (5) or has been acquired (1). Founders own more than half of the shares in 
86% the sample firms. About 36% of startups consider their enterprise to be a socially driven 
business - that is, one that exists primarily to achieve social or environmental objectives 
through enterprise and trading. Table A1 shows summary statistics for numeric variables 
collected in the survey. 
Startups in our sample have a wide range of sizes and other characteristics. The typical startup 
does not have positive sales turnover or assets when joining an accelerator, but grows 
substantially and attracts investment in the following period. It is important to note here that we 
do not observe when startups exit accelerators, as many accelerators have alumni 
programmes or soft exits, which makes it difficult to define an exit event. For this reason, we 
observe the entire period since applying to an accelerator until today, but scale variables by 
the length of this period wherever appropriate. 
Startups are clustered in the digital and health sectors, with 22% of startups reporting some 
business in either sector (see Table A2). Education and engineering/manufacturing are the 
mentioned by 13% and 11% of startups. Startups were allowed to choose any number of 
sectors to allow for businesses operating in multiple sectors. For the purpose of our 
quantitative analyses and in light of the relatively small sample size, we combine these sectors 
into eight categories: 24% of startups are in the agriculture/construction/transport/retail sector, 
21% in professional services and research sector, 8% in public administration and services, 
24% in manufacturing, 12% in arts, 31% in information and software, 13% in education, and 
22% in the health sector. 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics. The table below shows descriptive statistics for variables 
that were measured on a numerical scale. Most variables are measured for the year before 
joining an accelerator and for the most recent financial year. The number of patents is the 
number of patent applications since joining an accelerator. R&D is the amount of expenditures 
for research and development in the most recent financial year. Mentoring intensity is 
calculated from a numerical representation of survey responses: 0=None, 1=Less than 1 
hour/week, 2=1-2 hours/week, 3=3-4 hours/week, 4=5-8 hours/week, 5=9-16 hours/week, 
6=17+ hours/week. 
  N Min Max Mean Median SD 
Patents (number) 408 0 21 0.4 0 1.5 
R&D (£’000) 286 0 10,000 190.9 25 706.9 
Employees before joining 299 0 243 3.6 1 14.8 
Employees now 292 0 284 8.4 3 22.1 
Employees with a degree 
(before joining) 
291 0 243 3.3 1 14.7 
Employees with a degree 
(today) 
285 0 284 7.1 3 21.1 
Sales (before joining, £’000) 275 0 34,600 199.9 0 2,106.0 
Sales (today, £’000) 270 0 85,700 594.7 35 5,267.0 
Pre-tax profit (before joining, 
£’000) 
248 -4,000 10,600 15.5 0 727.8 
Pre-tax profit (today, £’000) 243 -5,000 35,800 56.5 0 2,355.7 
Total assets (before joining, 
£’000) 
240 0 2,000 49.4 0 198.6 
Total assets (today, £’000) 233 0 5,000 189.8 5978 587.1 
Investment (before joining, 
£’000) 
267 0 366,30
0 
1530.7 0 22,423.0 
Investment (total to date, £’000) 
267 0 443,30
0 
22349.8 50000 27,152.6 
Mentoring intensity 242 0 6 1.9 2 1.4 
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Table A2: Sector distribution. Enterprises were asked to select all sectors that apply to 
their business. 222 enterprises said they operate in exactly one sector, 112 operate in two 
sectors, 58 operate in three sectors, and 49 operate in more than 3 sectors. N=441. 
Industry sector Frequency Percentage 
Agritech 22 5% 
Civtech / Public Sector Innovation 11 2% 
Cleantech/Energy and the Environment 45 10% 
Construction 9 2% 
Creative Industries and Design 38 9% 
Cyber Security 12 3% 
Digital (including generalist AI & generalist blockchain) 97 22% 
Education 57 13% 
Engineering and Manufacturing 50 11% 
Extractive industries (mining, oil & gas, fishing, forestry) 6 1% 
Fintech (including insurance tech) 37 8% 
Food 35 8% 
Health and Wellbeing 96 22% 
Internet of Things (IoT) 46 10% 
Leisure 19 4% 
Life Sciences 26 6% 
Marketing technology 29 7% 
Retail and e-commerce 57 13% 
Smart Cities 30 7% 
Space and Satellite Technology 11 2% 
Telecommunication 6 1% 
Transport 21 5% 
Other 94 21% 
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Appendix 5.4. Supplementary information on sample used for 
analysis of corporate accelerator’s impact  
The average firm in the sample has 4.58 employees, 1.11 founders, is less than one year in 
age, is 46% likely to have raised outside financing, and has raised an average of $150,000 
USD in outside financing at the time of application. Relative to applicants of ecosystem 
accelerators worldwide, as summarised by Gonzalez-Uribe and Leatherbee (2016) using data 
from the Emory Database, the businesses applying to the corporate accelerator appear 
younger, bigger and more developed as measured by previous fundraising. 
The distribution of application scores is not continuous: rounded scores are disproportionately 
more prevalent (see Figure A1 for application score histograms). The prevalence of ties is a 
consequence of the scoring approach, which is based on open discussion and agreement by 
staff about projects’ prospects, which naturally leads the group to classify applicants into round 
scores (as opposed to independent scoring of applicants across staff members, and with 
multiple criteria, as in other settings, which leads to more continuous score distributions; see 
Gonzalez-Uribe and Reyes, 2019).  
Table A3: Sample composition for analysis of corporate accelerator on participating 
startups. The table describes the sample composition by cohort. The data also includes 
information on post-application performance within 5 years of application to the accelerator, 
hand-collected by the authors using online searches in LinkedIn and Crunchbase. LinkedIn in 
one of the most common tools to recruit new hires among young, high-tech firms. Crunchbase 
is the most popular public site collecting information about funding rounds for young, high-tech 
firms. 
 Applicants 
Parti
cipan
ts 
Compa
nies in 
Top-20 
Particip
ants in 
Top-20 
P(Accel
eration) 
P(Accele
ration/To
p20) 
Avera
ge 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
of Score 
Cohort 1 41 6 22 5 0.15 0.23 3.34 1.14 
Cohort 2 201 9 37 9 0.05 0.24 1.88 1.2 
Cohort 3 130 4 23 4 0.03 0.17 1.38 0.97 
Cohort 4 98 7 20 6 0.07 0.3 2.76 0.71 
Cohort 5 168 10 25 9 0.06 0.36 2.36 1.14 
Total 638 36 127 33 0.06 0.26 2.13 1.19 
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Table A4: Summary Statistics for analysis of corporate accelerator on participating 
startups. The table presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. 
Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average Score 638 2.13 1.19 1 5 
Z 638 6.76 9.32 -13 46 
Acceleration 638 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Number of 
employees 638 4.58 4.14 0 45 
Number of founders 638 1.11 1.33 0 7 
Company age 638 0.86 1.54 0 14 
Value fundraising 638 150,565 663,432 0 10,900,000 
Outside Financing 638 0.46 0.5 0 1 
Family and friends 638 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Grant 638 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Business angels 638 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Venture Capital 638 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Online presence 638 0.8 0.4 0 1 
Change in employees 638 -0.25 1.07 -3 5 
Change in fundraising 638 306,831 2,250,943 -10,900,000 36,000,000 
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Figure A1: Distribution of Application Scores. The figure plots the histogram of application 
scores across 0.1 bins. Panel B (C) use the sub-sample of applicants in London cohorts with 
ties below (above) the median number of ties across cohorts: 
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Appendix 5.5. Supplementary methodology for analysis of 
corporate accelerator on participating startups 
5.5.1 Discontinuity of Acceleration at the Interview Threshold 
In this Section we first show evidence of discontinuity of acceleration at the interview threshold. 
We then present evidence against the empirical relevance of potential manipulation of ranks 
around the threshold.  
The discontinuity in acceleration at the interview threshold is visible in Figure A2 of this 
appendix. We plot the fraction of participating applicants against the normalized rank (i.e., the 
ranking of the startup minus 20) calculated across bins of 1 rank and plotted in dots. Because 
we plot acceleration against normalized ranking, higher ranking companies are represented to 
the left of the interview threshold, which corresponds to the 0 in the x-axis. 
Figure A2 below plots the probability of acceleration against normalized rank based on 
estimates of equation (1). Panel B (C) use the sub-sample of applicants in London cohorts with 
top-20 ties below (above) the median number of top-20 ties across cohorts. The solid line 
depicts the coefficients estimates and the dashed line the 95th confidence interval. The dots 
correspond to simple average probability of acceleration for bins of size 1 of normalized score. 
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Figure A2: Probability of Acceleration and Normalized Ranking 
 
 
 
 
We estimate the size of the discontinuity using the following equation: 
where i indexes startups, acceleration indicates whether the applicant participated in the 
corporate accelerator and Top20i is a dummy that equals 1 if the applicant ranked higher than 
the interview threshold (i.e., among the top 20 companies). f(Zi) and f’(Zi) are low-degree 
polynomials on the normalized rank Z (i.e., the rank of the company minus 20), that include 
interactions with 2-quantiles of number of applicants that tie at the 20-th rank (i.e., the variable 
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High indicates observations in cohorts at the top 2-quantile of number of companies tied at the 
20-th rank). The use of low-degree polynomials that can differ on either side of the threshold is 
standard in the literature: (Gelman and Imbens 2017) warn against estimation noise from using 
global high-order polynomials. The inclusion of interactions of 2-quantiles of score ties is more 
novel, but necessary, given the prevalence of score ties in the sample (see Table A5 and 
Figure A2). 
An important data limitation is the normalized ranking discreteness. (Lee and Card 2008) note 
that discrete sorting variables can require greater extrapolation of the outcome’s conditional 
expectation at the threshold as well as clustering observations at the level of the sorting 
variable, though the fundamental econometrics are not different. Thus, we present results 
clustering standard errors at the score level to control for heteroscedasticity across applicants 
with the same score. To determine the appropriate polynomial, we employ Lee and Card’s 
(2008) goodness-of-fit test for RD with discrete covariates, which compares unrestricted and 
restricted regressions.55 We cannot reject the null that the unrestricted regression does not 
provide a better fit using linear polynomials that are allowed to differ on each side of the 
threshold and include interactions with High¸ which is our main specification of equation 1 (see 
Column 7 in Table A5). Nevertheless, in what follows we also present results using other 
specifications of equation 1 for comparison. 
The estimated discontinuity is sizable, significant and robust. Table A5 presents robust 
estimates of across different specifications of Equation (1), with varying polynomial degrees. 
The coefficient of Top20 in Column 7 implies that ranking higher than the interview threshold 
increases the probability of acceleration by 15.1% relative to other applicants in the same 
cohort. The coefficient on Top 20×High implies that the jump is not statistically different for 
applicants in cohorts among the top 2-quantile of score ties. The F-test of the excluded 
instruments (i.e., Top20 and Top 20×High) shows that the instruments are not weak: they 
exceed the rule of thumb of 10 (Stock et al. 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 The unrestricted regression projects the acceleration indicator variable on indicator variables for each of the K 
ranks. The restricted regression is like equation (1). The goodness of fit statistic in the presence of non-normal 
homoscedastic errors is G≡(ESSR-ESSUR)/(ESSUR(N-K)), where ESS is the sum of squared errors, N is the 
number of observations, and J is the number of restricted parameters. G has a chi-squared distribution. The null 
hypothesis is that the unrestricted model does not provide a better fit. If G exceeds its critical value, we reject the 
null and turn to a higher order polynomial. 
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Table A5: Probability of Acceleration. The table presents estimates of different specification 
of equation (1). The standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the normalized rank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dep. Var. 
Acceleration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Top20 
0.192*** 
0.169**
* 0.184*** 0.150*** 0.190** 0.199*** 0.151*** 
  (0.044) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.080) (0.067) (0.047) 
Top 20×High       0.025 -0.010 -0.007 0.017 
        (0.080) (0.107) (0.086) (0.070) 
Z -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
Z×High       0.001 0.004 0.002   
        (0.004) (0.014) (0.004)   
Z×Top 20 -0.034** -0.042 -0.049 -0.022 0.071 0.058 -0.022 
  (0.017) (0.045) (0.044) (0.018) (0.048) (0.042) (0.018) 
Z×Top 20×High       -0.084*** -0.076 -0.066 -0.081*** 
        (0.021) (0.086) (0.076) (0.020) 
Z2   0.000     0.000     
    (0.000)     (0.000)     
Z2× High         0.000     
          (0.000)     
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Dep. Var. 
Acceleration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Z2×Top 20   -0.001 -0.002   0.008* 0.007*   
    (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004)   
Z2×Top 20×High         0.015 0.016   
          (0.013) (0.013)   
Observations 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 
R2 0.226 0.228 0.227 0.261 0.276 0.275 0.261 
F All excluded 
instruments 18.77 11.99 15.32 40.88 24.56 94.01 60.88 
 
We present three pieces of quantitative evidence against the empirical relevance of ranking 
manipulation around the threshold. First, in Figure A3 we show there is no obvious 
discontinuity in the distribution of normalized ranking at the interview threshold (i.e., normalized 
rank of 0): in fact, Panel A shows that the distribution is much more concentrated at a 
normalized rank of 1 (17.40%) and at a normalized rank of 6 (21.16%).56 Consistent with the 
patterns in scores (Figure A2), the figure shows that the distribution of the normalized rank is 
not continuous, mainly due to the tendency of the scoring process to produce round scores. 
Panels B-F in the figure show large variation in the distribution of normalized rank across 
cohorts, pointing to the importance of controlling for the 2-quantiles of number of companies 
tied at the top 20 in the RD exercise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 Unfortunately, the discreteness of the normalized rank prevents a McCrary density test, which is standard in RD 
applications exploiting continuous sorting variables. 
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Figure A3: Distribution of Normalized Ranking (distribution of normalized ranks across 
cohorts) 
 
Second, Figure A4 shows that companies ranking closely on either side of the threshold are 
very similar in characteristics measured at the application stage. We estimate different 
specifications of equation (1) using application characteristics (rather than acceleration) as 
dependent variables: to ease exposition, we present results based on linear polynomials that 
are allowed to differ on either side of the threshold, but that do not vary by 2-quantiles of 
companies tied at the top 20 position. In contrast to the probability of acceleration, for most 
applicants’ characteristics we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no jump at the threshold. The 
only significant difference is for an indicator variable on outside financing—applicants who 
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ranked among the Top20 companies are more likely to have secured outside financing prior to 
application in the accelerator. Further inspection reveals that such capital arises from two 
sources: grants and venture capital. 
Figure A4, below, plots the distribution of normalized ranks across the cohorts. The solid line 
depicts the coefficients estimates and the dashed line the 95th confidence interval. The dots 
correspond to simple averages of the outcome variables for bins of size 1 of normalized score. 
Figure A4: Characteristics of Applicants at the Application Stage 
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The final piece of evidence against the empirical relevance of ranking manipulation, is the 
insensitivity of results to controlling for differences in outside financing at the application stage. 
Table A6 shows that the size of the discontinuity are invariant to including a dummy of outside 
financing at the application stage as a control variable. The F-test continues to surpass the rule 
of thumb of 10. While it is impossible to fully test the assumption of no sorting on observables 
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in the neighbourhood of the interview threshold (i.e., the staff at the accelerator observe more 
data than the econometrician), taken together the preponderance of evidence suggests the RD 
design is valid. 
Table A6: Probability of Acceleration controlling for differences in outside financing at 
application. The table presents estimates of different specification of equation (1). The 
standard errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at the normalized rank level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dep. Var. 
Acceleration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Top20 
0.182*** 
0.1
63*
** 0.176*** 
0.146
*** 0.187** 0.195*** 
0.147**
* 
  
(0.044) 
(0.0
49) (0.047) 
(0.04
6) (0.078) (0.065) (0.045) 
Top 20×High       0.018 -0.009 -0.011 0.012 
  
      
(0.07
9) (0.106) (0.082) (0.068) 
Z 
-0.000 
-
0.0
04 -0.000 
-
0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 
  
(0.002) 
(0.0
05) (0.002) 
(0.00
2) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
Z×High       0.001 0.005 0.002   
  
      
(0.00
4) (0.014) (0.004)   
Z×Top 20 
-0.034** 
-
0.0
38 -0.045 
-
0.022 0.071 0.059 -0.023 
  
(0.017) 
(0.0
46) (0.044) 
(0.01
8) (0.047) (0.040) (0.018) 
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Dep. Var. 
Acceleration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Z×Top 20×High 
      
-
0.082
*** -0.047 -0.036 
-
0.079**
* 
  
      
(0.02
1) (0.089) (0.081) (0.021) 
Z2 
  
0.0
00     0.000     
  
  
(0.0
00)     (0.000)     
Z2× High         -0.000     
          (0.000)     
Z2×Top 20 
  
-
0.0
01 -0.001   0.008* 0.007*   
  
  
(0.0
04) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004)   
Z2×Top 20×High         0.022 0.022   
          (0.015) (0.015)   
Outside Financing 
0.032* 
0.0
30* 0.032* 
0.030
* 0.031* 0.031* 0.030** 
  
(0.017) 
(0.0
17) (0.017) 
(0.01
5) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Observations 638 638 638 638 638 638 638 
R2 
0.226 
0.2
28 0.227 0.261 0.276 0.275 0.261 
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Dep. Var. 
Acceleration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
F All excluded 
instruments 18.77 
11.
99 15.32 40.88 24.56 94.01 60.88 
 
5.5.2 Exploiting the Interview Threshold 
We estimate a local average treatment effect of acceleration on venture performance by 
instrumenting acceleration, with the interview rule in a fuzzy RD design. We estimate a system 
of equations using (1) above and the following: In detail, we estimate the following system of 
equations: 
 
where outcome measures company performance. g(Zi) and g’(Zi) are linear polynomials on the 
normalized rank Z, that include interactions with 2-quantiles of number of applicants that tie at 
the 20-th rank. Some specifications use controls Xi in order to reduce sampling variability and 
control for some visible differences in characteristics at application (see Figure A4). As with all 
instrumental variable estimators, inference based on our fuzzy RD is restricted to those 
observations that respond to the instrument; that is, applicants that are randomized into the 
accelerator by the interview rule. 
Appendix 5.6. Supplementary results for analysis of one 
corporate accelerator on participating startups  
Results are summarized in Tables A7 - A9. We present results using two different 
specifications of the system of equations (1)-(2). The corresponding first-stage results for 
columns 1-3 (4-6) in each panel are reported in column 4 (7) of Appendix 4, Table A6. 
We find evidence of impacts on our three outcomes variables: online presence (Table A7), 
change in employees (Table A8), and change in fundraising (Table A9). 
The interpretation of the coefficient in column 6 of Table A7 is that acceleration leads to an 
increase of 50% in online presence for the applicants at the margin of acceleration. Column 4 
in the same table shows evidence of downward bias in the OLS estimate that compares 
average online presence between participants and rejected applicants, and does not control for 
endogeneity in participation. This downward bias likely reflects differences between average 
applicants, and those applicants at the margin of acceleration (i.e., those whose participation is 
affected by the selection rule), as is common in the estimation of local average treatment 
effects. 
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Table A7: Online Presence and Acceleration. The table presents results from estimating 
different specifications of the system of equations (1)-(2). The standard errors are presented in 
parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the normalized rank level. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. Online Presence 
OLS RF IV OLS RF IV 
Acceleration 0.218***   0.377 0.226***   0.520** 
  (0.037)   (0.250) (0.037)   (0.235) 
Top20   0.110     0.101   
    (0.090)     (0.089)   
Top 20×High   -0.102     -0.032   
    (0.143)     (0.118)   
Z -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006** -0.005* -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Z×High -0.009* -0.011 -0.008       
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)       
Z×Top 20 0.022 0.024 0.028* 0.031** 0.031* 0.040** 
  (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) 
Z×Top 20×High 0.044 0.017 0.058 0.010 -0.008 0.042 
  (0.032) (0.029) (0.040) (0.021) (0.026) (0.034) 
Observations 638 638 638 638 638 638 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
R2 0.226 0.228 0.227 0.261 0.276 0.275 
 
The interpretation of the coefficient in column 6 of Table A8 is that acceleration increases 
employment growth, helping applicants transition up, by roughly one level, in the online 
classification of employee size. Given that the average applicant has 5 employees at 
application (i.e., the first level of online employee size: 1-10 employees), the estimated 
average transition is towards the second level of employee size: between 11 and 50 
employees. Similarly to the effect on online presence, a comparison between column 4 and 
column 6 reveals that an OLS comparison between accelerated and rejected applicants 
underestimates the effect of acceleration on employee growth for companies at the margin of 
acceleration (i.e., those whose participation is affected by the selection rule of the accelerator). 
Finally, the interpretation of the coefficient in column 6 of Table A9 is that acceleration 
increases fundraising by 77.6%. A comparison between columns 4 and 7 shows that similar to 
the OLS biases for online presence and employee growth, not controlling for selection effects 
in estimating the effect of acceleration biases downwards the estimated effect. We present 
results controlling for differences at application in the probability of having secured outside 
financing by the application; corresponding first-stage results for columns 1-3 (4-6) are 
presented in column 4(7) of Table A6. Results are quantitatively similar if we do not control for 
this difference at the application stage. Results are also robust to using changes in the level of 
fundraising, rather than changes in logarithms. We present results using the changes in 
logarithms, to control for the effect of outliers in the data. 
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Table A8: Employee Growth and Acceleration. The table presents results from estimating 
different specifications of the system of equations (1)-(2). The standard errors are presented in 
parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the normalized rank level. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. Changes in 
Employees OLS RF IV OLS RF IV 
Acceleration 
0.676***   0.870 
0.689**
*   1.127** 
  (0.158)   (0.570) (0.157)   (0.538) 
Top20   0.336**     0.314**   
    (0.162)     (0.155)   
Top 20×High   -0.400     -0.240   
    (0.288)     (0.219)   
Z -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Z×High -0.015 -0.026 -0.014       
  (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)       
Z×Top 20 0.068 0.075 0.075 0.083 0.090* 0.096 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.058) (0.051) (0.053) (0.059) 
Z×Top 20×High 0.088 -0.005 0.104 0.031 -0.062 0.078 
  (0.113) (0.096) (0.120) (0.086) (0.086) (0.102) 
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Observations 638 638 638 638 638 638 
R2 0.226 0.228 0.227 0.261 0.276 0.275 
 
Table A9: Fundraising Growth and Acceleration. The table presents results from estimating 
different specifications of the system of equations (1)-(2). The standard errors are presented in 
parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the normalized rank level. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Var. Changes in 
Fundraising OLS RF IV OLS RF IV 
Acceleration 0.617***   1.063*** 0.607***   0.776*** 
  (0.136)   (0.271) (0.135)   (0.257) 
Top20   -0.026     0.006   
    (0.052)     (0.059)   
Top 20×High   0.278***     0.042   
    (0.094)     (0.100)   
Z -0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.007 0.005 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Z×High 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.029***       
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)       
Z×Top 20 0.020 -0.000 0.026 -0.006 -0.022 -0.015 
  (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) 
Z×Top 20×High   -0.026     0.006   
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    (0.052)     (0.059)   
Outside Financing 
-0.485*** -0.470*** -0.502*** -0.496*** 
-
0.482**
* -0.503*** 
  (0.059) (0.058) (0.064) (0.058) (0.058) (0.062) 
Observations 638 638 638 638 638 638 
R2 0.120 0.102 0.118 0.111 0.090 0.102 
Appendix 5.7 Supplementary methodology for estimating the 
effect of the type of support provided by accelerators and 
incubators on startup outcomes 
Estimation techniques follow the type of dependent variable that is being modelled in any 
particular case. Most models are ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, while for binary 
choice variables or count data, such as patents, we use Probit, Poisson or Negative Binomial 
models. All models of startup support control for industry sector, development stage, size and 
the year in which the startup joined the programme.  
Table A10: Definitions of dependent variables in estimations of startup support. This 
table shows variable definitions for our main regressions that test the impact on startups of 
support and mentoring received from accelerator and incubators. 
Variable Definition 
Perceived 
impact 
Perceived impact is measured as startup’s answer to the question “Looking 
back, what impact has the support provided by [programme name] had on 
this enterprise's chance of success?” assigning a numerical value: -1 = 
Negative, 0 = None, 1 = Minor, 2 = Significant, 3 = Vital. 
Employment 
growth 
Growth in employment is defined as Log(employment in the last financial 
year + 1) - Log(employment when joining the programme + 1), divided by the 
number of years since joining the accelerator. If the last financial year for 
which data is available is the same as the year in which the respondent 
joined the programme, we assume that the period over which growth is 
measured is half a year. 
Growth in 
employees 
with a 
degree 
The number of employees with a degree is derived from the question, “If any 
of the employees above hold a degree or postgraduate qualification, please 
provide a rough estimation of how many. “Growth in the proportion of 
employees with a degree is defined as (number of employees with a degree 
in the last financial year − number of employees with a degree when joining 
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the programme)/(number of employees with a degree when joining the 
programme + 1). 
Development 
stage 
A startup’s development stage is defined at the time when applying to a 
programme and when completing the survey. Possible stages when applying 
to a programme are Idea-stage (did not yet have a working prototype or 
customers), Prototype-stage (had a working prototype but had not yet earned 
revenue), Post-revenue stage (had customers and functioning revenue 
models but was not yet cash-flow positive), Growth-stage (was operating at 
scale and was typically cash flow positive), Mature-stage, and similarly for 
the startup’s current stage. 
Innovation 
Innovation is measured as a respondent’s answer to the question, “Since 
applying to [name of accelerator/incubator], has this enterprise introduced a 
new or significantly improved product, process or service to market?”; 
dummy variable. 
Patents 
The number of patents is measured as the response to the question, “If your 
enterprise has submitted any patent applications since applying to [name of 
accelerator/incubator], please enter how many. (Enter 0 if no applications 
were submitted)” 
R&D 
expenditure 
R&D expenditure is derived from the question, “What was this enterprise's 
total approximate research and development (R&D refers to any activity 
undertaken in developing new or improving existing products or services) 
expenditure in the last financial year?”; in pounds sterling. 
Investment 
raised 
The investment raised, used as a dependent variable, is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the total investment received by the respondent in the 
most fiscal year is greater than the investment received until joining the 
programme. It is based on the question, “Approximately how much 
investment (equity, convertible notes, grants, but not loans) has this 
enterprise received from outside sources? … Before applying to [programme] 
… Total investment received to date (since inception of the enterprise, 
excluding any received from [programme name])”. 
 
Table A11: Definitions of independent variables of interest 
Variable Definition 
Support by accelerator 
Support variables are answers to the question, “During this 
enterprise's time in [programme name], did it receive any of 
the following, and was it useful to the enterprise?”  
These dummy variables are equal to one if the type of 
support was received and zero otherwise.  
Access to partners & 
customers 
Access to investors 
Access to peers 
Testing & refining business 
model 
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Help with team formation 
Direct funding from the 
programme 
Business skills development 
Press or media exposure 
Lab space or equipment 
Legal, financial, marketing or 
HR support 
Help measuring social impact 
Office space 
Coaching / personal 
development 
Mentoring 
 
Industry expert 
Mentoring types are answers to the question, “Did any of 
this enterprise's mentors during [name of 
accelerator/incubator] fall into the following categories?” 
These dummy variables are equal to one if the type of 
mentoring was received and zero otherwise. 
Entrepreneur (exited a 
venture) 
 
Entrepreneur (not exited) 
 
VC / angel 
 
Consultant, business 
developer 
 
  
Mentoring intensity 
Mentoring intensity is the response to the question, “During 
this enterprise's time in {{programme name}}, roughly how 
many hours per week did directors and employees of your 
enterprise spend in one-to-one mentoring?”, coded 
numerically into 0 = “None” to 8 = “17+ hours/ week” 
according to Table XX5. 
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Table A12: Definitions of control variables 
Variable Definition 
Accelerators joined in 
the past 
Number of other accelerators or incubators in which the startup has 
participated or is currently participating 
Stage before The enterprise’s development stage when applying to the 
programme; can be one of {idea, prototype, post-revenue, growth}; 
dummy variable 
Employees when 
joining 
Number of people working for the enterprise, including full-time 
equivalent part-time employees (but excluding contract workers who 
are not on the business' official payroll) 
Currently participating 
in programme 
The enterprise is currently participating in an accelerator or incubator 
programme; dummy variable. 
Year  The year in which the enterprise joined an accelerator or incubator 
Industry sector One of eight broad sectors, using Beauhurst’s sector classification 
and aggregated based on UK-SIC 2007 codes to achieve meaningful 
cell counts: 
1: Agritech, extractive industries, construction, transport, retail 
2: Professional services (life sciences, marketing technology, space 
and satellite technology, finance (incl. fintech and insurance tech) 
3: Public sector (civtech, smart cities) 
4: Manufacturing (cleantech, engineering, food) 
5: Arts (creative industries and design, leisure) 
6: Information technology (cyber security, digital (including generalist 
AI & generalist 
blockchain), Internet of Things (IoT), telecommunication) 
7: Education 
8: Health and wellbeing 
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Appendix 5.8. Mentoring received by survey participants 
Table A13: Mentoring support. This table shows how many hours per week directors and 
employees of startups spent in one-to-one mentoring while participating in an accelerator or 
incubator. 
 Full sample Accelerators Other programmes57 
Duration N % N % N % 
None 31 11% 19 9% 12 19% 
Less than 1 hour/ 
week 98 36% 72 34% 26 42% 
1-2 hours / week 77 28% 62 30% 15 24% 
3-4 hours / week 34 13% 28 13% 6 10% 
5-8 hours / week 15 6% 14 7% 1 2% 
9-16 hours / week 11 4% 10 5% 1 2% 
17+ hours/ week 6 2% 5 2% 1 2% 
 272 100% 210 100% 62 100% 
 
Table A14: Mentor types. This table shows whether any of the startups’ mentors during their 
participation in an accelerator or incubator fall into any of the mentoring categories. 
Mentor type N =  Yes No Don’t know 
Industry expert 267 58% 34% 9% 
Entrepreneur who had previously sold a 
business 267 57% 33% 11% 
Entrepreneur who had not sold a business 259 51% 33% 17% 
Venture capitalist or business angel 262 45% 43% 12% 
Consultant, business developer 263 67% 22% 11% 
 
57 "Other" programmes includes 44 startups in incubators, 1 in a coworking space, 1 in a coworking space plus, 9 
in "other" programmes (in The Startup Tribe, UnLtd, Activate Capital, Entrepreneur First) and 7 missing values on 
programme type. 
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Appendix 5.9. Improvements suggested by startups 
Table A15: Improvements suggested by startups. This table shows potential 
improvements that are mentioned by startups in their free comments to the startup survey, 
which we have clustered by theme. Numbers in parentheses show the number of 
occurrences for each improvement. Improvements with fewer than two mentions per theme 
have been omitted. 
Theme Improvement mentioned by startups 
Funding Further funding: help in getting more funding, access to investors, 
preparation in getting public funding, high-impact fundraising strategy, angel 
pitching events (x10) 
Direct funding during the programme (e.g., in the form of equity), or additional 
funding based on quality of business proposition (x3) 
Lower cost of capital for social businesses 
Financial management help 
But: too much focus on pitching to investors 
Mentoring More mentors with specific industry experience, thought leaders in the 
industry; but mentors need to be engaged (x8) 
More general mentoring: support from entrepreneurs as mentors, one-to-one, 
online talks (x6) 
Greater availability of support by the programme director, needs to be 100% 
dedicated to the programme (x2) 
Less turnover of mentors 
Long-term 
support 
Long-term perspective needed, particularly for social businesses; pressure to 
get VC is not always optimal (x8) 
Peers and 
community 
Help with the social aspect (working in a small team can feel lonely) (x2) 
Investigate possibilities of peer support (x2) 
Have people with similar businesses work together 
Market More introductions to customers, qualified leads; focus on market fit (x5) 
Exit from the 
programme 
Support after the accelerator to bridge the “valley of death”; updates and 
advice, not just events (x4) 
Support when leaving the programme to manage the transition 
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Appendix 5.10. Impact of support activities 
Table A16: Impact of support on perceived impact of programmes. The dependent 
variable is the startups’ perception of the impact that accelerators and incubators had on 
their success. All models include effects for industry sectors and the year of joining the 
programme. Model 2 is optimised to keep only variables with p<0.1, starting with model 1 
and removing the least significant variable until only significant variables remain. Standard 
errors clustered by programme are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** 
p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) 
 Full model Optimised 
Model: OLS OLS 
Support by programme   
Access to partners & customers 0.339 (0.15) ** 0.379 (0.11) *** 
Access to investors -0.097 (0.13)      
Access to peers 0.369 (0.26)      
Testing & refining business model 0.383 (0.15) ** 0.402 (0.12) *** 
Help with team formation 0.439 (0.13) *** 0.467 (0.10) *** 
Direct funding from the programme 0.284 (0.15) * 0.280 (0.11) ** 
Business skills development 0.240 (0.21)      
Press or media exposure 0.120 (0.15)      
Lab space or equipment -0.103 (0.20)      
Legal, financial, marketing or HR 
support 0.329 (0.20)   0.345 (0.20) * 
Help measuring social impact 0.153 (0.11)      
Office space -0.031 (0.15)      
Coaching / personal development -0.067 (0.17)      
Mentoring       
Industry expert 0.229 (0.13) * 0.207 (0.12) * 
Entrepreneur (exited a venture) 0.055 (0.16)      
Entrepreneur (not exited) -0.004 (0.11)      
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VC / angel 0.055 (0.15)      
Consultant, business developer -0.060 (0.16)      
Mentoring intensity -0.007 (0.05)      
Control variables       
Accelerators joined in the past -0.020 (0.07)      
Stage before: Idea 0.418 (0.22) * 0.563 (0.19) *** 
Stage before: Post-revenue 0.029 (0.24)   0.174 (0.18)   
Stage before: Prototype 0.209 (0.23)   0.351 (0.18) * 
Employees when joining -0.011 (0.10)      
Currently participating in 
programme 0.321 (0.14) ** 0.302 (0.12) ** 
Observations 230   254   
F-stat. p-value 0.000   0.000   
R-squared 0.445   0.389   
R-squared (adj.) 0.328   0.364   
 
Table A17: Impact of support on employment growth. The dependent variable is the 
growth in employment, defined as Log(employment when joining the programme + 1) - 
Log(employment today), divided by the number of years since joining the programme. All 
models include effects for industry sectors and the year of joining the programme. Model 2 is 
optimised to keep only variables with p<0.1, starting with model 1 and removing the least 
significant variable until only significant variables remain. Standard errors clustered by 
programme are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) 
 Full model Optimised 
Model: OLS OLS 
Support by programme   
Access to partners & customers -0.039 (0.07)      
Access to investors -0.006 (0.07)      
Access to peers 0.341 (0.11) *** 0.265 (0.10) ** 
Testing & refining business model -0.320 (0.12) ** -0.314 (0.10) *** 
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Help with team formation 0.128 (0.07) * 0.117 (0.06) ** 
Direct funding from the programme 0.144 (0.08) * 0.153 (0.06) ** 
Business skills development -0.159 (0.11)      
Press or media exposure 0.212 (0.07) *** 0.134 (0.06) ** 
Lab space or equipment -0.115 (0.08)      
Legal, financial, marketing or HR 
support -0.157 (0.08) **    
Help measuring social impact 0.160 (0.11)      
Office space 0.050 (0.08)      
Coaching / personal development 0.034 (0.09)      
Mentoring       
Industry expert -0.055 (0.08)      
Entrepreneur (exited a venture) 0.017 (0.08)      
Entrepreneur (not exited) -0.063 (0.07)      
VC / angel 0.237 (0.10) ** 0.136 (0.07) ** 
Consultant, business developer -0.271 (0.07) *** -0.256 (0.07) *** 
Mentoring intensity 0.085 (0.05) * 0.060 (0.03) * 
Control variables       
Accelerators joined in the past -0.057 (0.06)      
Stage before: Idea -0.116 (0.11)      
Stage before: Post-revenue -0.072 (0.12)      
Stage before: Prototype -0.057 (0.14)      
Employees when joining -0.233 (0.05) *** -0.191 (0.04) *** 
Currently participating in programme -0.128 (0.08) * -0.126 (0.05) ** 
Observations 229   240   
F-stat. p-value 0.000   0.000   
R-squared 0.426   0.353   
R-squared (adj.) 0.304   0.309   
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Table A18: Impact of support on employees with a degree. The dependent variable is 
the growth in the proportion of employees with a degree, scaled by the number of years 
since joining the programme. All models include effects for industry sectors and the year of 
joining the programme. Model 2 is optimised to keep only variables with p<0.1, starting with 
model 1 and removing the least significant variable until only significant variables remain. 
Standard errors clustered by programme are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; 
** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) 
 Full model Optimised 
Model: OLS OLS 
Support by programme   
Access to partners & customers 0.372 (0.47)      
Access to investors -0.029 (0.28)      
Access to peers 1.041 (0.43) ** 1.226 (0.50) ** 
Testing & refining business model -1.285 (0.59) ** -1.150 (0.63) * 
Help with team formation 0.065 (0.36)      
Direct funding from the programme 0.292 (0.27)      
Business skills development -1.491 (0.93)      
Press or media exposure 0.246 (0.20)      
Lab space or equipment 0.049 (0.58)      
Legal, financial, marketing or HR 
support -0.551 (0.32) *    
Help measuring social impact 0.988 (0.53) * 0.875 (0.41) ** 
Office space -0.236 (0.30)      
Coaching / personal development 0.519 (0.52)      
Mentoring       
Industry expert -0.153 (0.39)      
Entrepreneur (exited a venture) -0.299 (0.42)      
Entrepreneur (not exited) 0.013 (0.32)      
VC / angel 0.895 (0.43) ** 0.718 (0.27) *** 
Consultant, business developer -1.109 (0.41) *** -1.115 (0.46) ** 
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Mentoring intensity 0.312 (0.23)      
Control variables       
Accelerators joined in the past -0.192 (0.17)      
Stage before: Idea -1.238 (1.14)      
Stage before: Post-revenue -0.892 (0.78)      
Stage before: Prototype -1.418 (1.10)      
Employees when joining -0.919 (0.37) ** -0.609 (0.20) *** 
Currently participating in programme -0.485 (0.38)   -0.526 (0.29) * 
Observations 224   238   
F-stat. p-value 0.000   0.000   
R-squared 0.341   0.177   
R-squared (adj.) 0.197   0.141   
 
Table A19: Impact of support on development stage. The binary dependent variable 
indicates whether the startup has progressed to a further development stage after joining an 
accelerator or incubator programme. The assumed stage sequence is {dead, idea stage, 
prototype stage, post-revenue stage, growth stage, mature stage}. The sample excludes 1 
acquired startup, 4 startups with “other” or missing stage, as well as all 17 startups at the 
growth stage, which did not change their development stage. All models include effects for 
industry sectors and the year of joining the programme. Model 2 is optimised to keep only 
variables with p<0.1, starting with model 1 and removing the least significant variable until 
only significant variables remain. Standard errors clustered by programme are in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) 
 Full model Optimised 
Model: Probit Probit 
Support by programme   
Access to partners & 
customers 0.733 (0.56)      
Access to investors -0.233 (0.50)      
Access to peers 0.401 (0.46)      
Testing & refining 
business model 0.249 (0.35)      
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Help with team formation 1.147 (0.38) *** 0.724 (0.26) *** 
Direct funding from the 
programme 0.466 (0.36)      
Business skills 
development 0.271 (0.46)      
Press or media exposure -0.448 (0.38)      
Lab space or equipment -0.684 (0.48)      
Legal, financial, 
marketing or HR support -0.467 (0.31)      
Help measuring social 
impact -0.298 (0.28)      
Office space 0.270 (0.32)      
Coaching / personal 
development -1.569 (0.66) ** -0.663 (0.33) ** 
Mentoring       
Industry expert 0.556 (0.50)      
Entrepreneur (exited a 
venture) -0.211 (0.56)      
Entrepreneur (not exited) -0.732 (0.45)      
VC / angel -0.085 (0.40)      
Consultant, business 
developer 0.292 (0.34)      
Mentoring intensity -0.008 (0.17)      
Control variables       
Accelerators joined in the 
past -0.119 (0.19)      
Stage before: Idea       
Stage before: Post-
revenue -2.133 (0.51) *** -1.438 (0.27) *** 
Stage before: Prototype -0.984 (0.40) ** -0.659 (0.24) *** 
Employees when joining -0.304 (0.25)      
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Currently participating in 
programme -0.883 (0.40) ** -0.613 (0.24) ** 
Observations 215   245   
McFadden R-squared 0.450   0.303   
McFadden R-squared 
(adj.) 0.149   0.255   
AIC 217.03
4   217.585   
Chi-sq. p-value 0.000   0.000   
Log-Likelihood -
69.517   
-
100.793   
 
Table A20: Impact of support on innovation. The binary dependent variable indicates 
whether the startup has introduced a new or significantly improved product, process or 
service to market since applying to an accelerator or incubator programme. All models 
include effects for industry sectors and the year of joining the programme. Model 2 is 
optimised to keep only variables with p<0.1, starting with model 1 and removing the least 
significant variable until only significant variables remain. Standard errors clustered by 
programme are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) 
 Full model Optimised 
Model: Probit Probit 
Support by programme   
Access to partners & 
customers 0.071 (0.30)      
Access to investors -0.171 (0.31)      
Access to peers 0.546 (0.55)      
Testing & refining 
business model -0.539 (0.27) **    
Help with team 
formation 0.389 (0.27)   0.335 (0.18) * 
Direct funding from the 
programme 0.964 (0.33) *** 0.798 (0.22) *** 
Business skills 
development -0.260 (0.46)      
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Press or media 
exposure -0.191 (0.24)      
Lab space or 
equipment 0.025 (0.28)      
Legal, financial, 
marketing or HR 
support 0.096 (0.25)      
Help measuring social 
impact 0.524 (0.20) ***    
Office space -0.072 (0.36)      
Coaching / personal 
development 0.060 (0.29)      
Mentoring       
Industry expert 0.701 (0.28) ** 0.545 (0.28) ** 
Entrepreneur (exited a 
venture) 0.239 (0.35)      
Entrepreneur (not 
exited) -0.260 (0.30)      
VC / angel 0.025 (0.24)      
Consultant, business 
developer -0.442 (0.24) * -0.320 (0.19) * 
Mentoring intensity -0.063 (0.12)      
Control variables       
Accelerators joined in 
the past -0.050 (0.13)      
Stage before: Idea 0.125 (0.70)      
Stage before: Post-
revenue -0.567 (0.65)   -0.402 (0.18) ** 
Stage before: 
Prototype -0.529 (0.48)      
Employees when 
joining -0.040 (0.18)      
Currently participating 
in programme -0.698 (0.29) ** -0.513 (0.26) * 
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Observations 234   258   
McFadden R-squared 0.248   0.171   
McFadden R-squared 
(adj.) -0.057   0.102   
AIC 279.112   261.576   
Chi-sq. p-value 0.008   0.000   
Log-Likelihood 
-98.556   
-
119.788   
 
Table A21: Impact of support on patenting. The dependent variables in these models 
measure the patenting activity of startups. Model 1 is a log-linear model of the number of 
patents applications submitted since applying to the accelerator or incubator programme, 
model 2 uses the same variable but collapses it into a binary indicator of whether a startup is 
patenting, and model 3 uses a negative binomial model to predict the number of patents. All 
models have been optimised to keep only variables with p<0.1, starting with model 1 and 
removing the least significant variable until only significant variables remain. Standard errors 
in parentheses are clustered by programme for models 1 and 2, and ordinary standard errors 
for model 3. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: 
Patents 
(log) Patents>0 Patents 
Model: OLS Probit Neg. Binomial 
Support by 
programme          
Access to partners & 
customers -0.148 (0.08) *       
Access to investors       0.942 (0.39) ** 
Testing & refining 
business model       -1.472 (0.53) *** 
Business skills 
development -0.239 (0.13) *    -1.734 (0.43) *** 
Press or media 
exposure 0.176 (0.06) *** 0.687 (0.26) ***    
Legal, fin., marketing 
or HR support    -0.683 (0.32) **    
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Office space       -0.914 (0.37) ** 
Coaching / personal 
development 0.184 (0.11) *    1.349 (0.42) *** 
Mentoring          
Consultant, business 
developer 0.178 (0.06) *** 0.555 (0.32) * 1.004 (0.42) *** 
Mentoring intensity    0.254 (0.12) ** 0.479 (0.15) *** 
Control variables          
Accelerators joined in 
the past 0.146 (0.05) *** 0.339 (0.13) ** 0.597 (0.15) *** 
Stage before: Idea 0.406 (0.11) ***       
Stage before: Post 
revenue 0.108 (0.06) * -1.147 (0.32) *** -2.229 (0.62) *** 
Stage before: 
Prototype 0.211 (0.07) ***    -0.853 (0.36) ** 
Currently 
participating in 
programme -0.201 (0.09) ** -0.893 (0.33) *** -1.850 (0.58) *** 
Observations 237   218   216   
F-stat. p-value 0.000         
R-squared 0.252         
R-squared (adj.) 0.208         
McFadden R-
squared    0.257   0.176   
McFadden R-
squared (adj.)    0.173   0.121   
AIC    
180.94
1   322.544   
Chi-sq. p-value    0.000   0.000   
Log-Likelihood    
-
80.470   -53.690   
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Table A22: Impact of support on R&D. The dependent variables in these models measure 
the expenditures for research and development (R&D) of startups in the most recent 
financial year. Model 1 is a log-linear model of (R&D expenditures + 1), model 2 is the 
optimised version of this model which keeps only variables with p<0.1, starting with model 1 
and removing the least significant variable until only significant variables remain. The 
dependent variable in Model 3 in an indicator variables that is equal to one if the startup 
reports positive R&D expenditures in the most recent financial year. All models include year 
and sector effects (optimised models only if significant). Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered by programme. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Full model Optimised Optimised 
Model OLS OLS Probit 
Support by programme          
Access to partners & 
customers -0.296 (0.87)         
Access to investors 1.121 (1.18)   1.820 (0.67) ***    
Access to peers 0.969 (1.36)         
Testing & refining 
business model -1.613 (0.92) *       
Help with team 
formation 0.535 (0.59)         
Direct funding from the 
programme 1.914 (0.67) *** 2.022 (0.63) *** 0.714 (0.24) *** 
Business skills 
development 0.071 (1.21)         
Press or media 
exposure 0.279 (0.70)         
Lab space or equipment -1.512 (0.82) *    
-
0.560 (0.24) ** 
Legal, financial, 
marketing or HR support -0.952 (0.72)   -0.982 (0.57) * 
-
0.391 (0.18) ** 
Help measuring social 
impact 0.639 (0.66)         
Office space 0.781 (0.84)      0.778 (0.30) *** 
Coaching / personal 
development -0.442 (0.82)         
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Mentoring          
Industry expert -0.237 (0.64)         
Entrepreneur (exited a 
venture) 0.092 (0.94)         
Entrepreneur (not 
exited) 0.432 (0.66)         
VC / angel 0.897 (1.13)      0.440 (0.20) ** 
Consultant, business 
developer -0.499 (0.65)         
Mentoring intensity 0.039 (0.31)         
Control variables          
Accelerators joined in 
the past 0.562 (0.28) ** 0.387 (0.22) * 0.389 (0.19) ** 
Stage before: Idea 3.651 (1.37) *** 2.412 (1.26) *    
Stage before: Post 
revenue 1.440 (1.03)         
Stage before: Prototype 2.850 (1.13) ** 1.614 (0.81) **    
Employees when joining 1.978 (0.50) *** 1.774 (0.56) *** 0.473 (0.14) *** 
Currently participating in 
programme -1.497 (0.72) **    
-
0.512 (0.24) ** 
Observations 225   254   245   
F-stat. p-value 0.000   0.000      
R-squared 0.399   0.309      
R-squared (adj.) 0.268   0.281      
McFadden R-squared       0.300   
McFadden R-squared 
(adj.)       0.199   
AIC       
223.9
15   
Chi-sq. p-value       0.000   
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Log-Likelihood       
-
96.95
8   
 
Table A23: Impact of support on investment raised. The binary dependent variable in this 
table measures whether the total amount of outside investment (equity, convertible notes, 
grants, but not loans) raised by the startup is greater than the total amount raised before 
applying to the accelerator or incubator programme. Standard errors clustered by programme 
are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
 (1) (2) 
 Full model Optimised 
Model Probit Probit 
Support by programme       
Access to partners & customers -0.368 (0.26)      
Access to investors 0.770 (0.37) ** 0.793 (0.25) *** 
Access to peers -0.135 (0.71)      
Testing & refining business model -0.966 (0.33) *** 
-
0.538 (0.22) ** 
Help with team formation 0.191 (0.23)      
Direct funding from the programme 0.448 (0.24) * 0.528 (0.20) *** 
Business skills development 0.296 (0.38)      
Press or media exposure 0.149 (0.29)      
Lab space or equipment -0.339 (0.32)      
Legal, financial, marketing or HR support -0.795 (0.32) ** 
-
0.446 (0.22) ** 
Help measuring social impact 0.412 (0.39)   0.512 (0.23) ** 
Office space 0.378 (0.30)      
Coaching / personal development 0.142 (0.39)      
Mentoring       
Industry expert -0.213 (0.27)      
Entrepreneur (exited a venture) -0.065 (0.35)      
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Entrepreneur (not exited) -0.302 (0.22)      
VC / angel 0.304 (0.35)      
Consultant, business developer -0.105 (0.36)      
Mentoring intensity 0.317 (0.22)      
Control variables       
Accelerators joined in the past 0.129 (0.18)      
Stage before: Idea 1.039 (0.32) *** 0.689 (0.23) *** 
Stage before: Post-revenue 0.175 (0.34)      
Stage before: Prototype 0.507 (0.28) *    
Employees when joining 0.201 (0.16)      
Currently participating in programme -0.322 (0.30)      
Observations 215   239   
F-stat. p-value       
R-squared       
R-squared (adj.)       
McFadden R-squared 0.272   0.178   
McFadden R-squared (adj.) -0.011   0.127   
AIC 
287.91
8   
277.4
14   
Chi-sq. p-value 0.000   0.000   
Log-Likelihood 
-
102.95
9   
-
129.7
07   
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Table A24: Robustness test - impact of accelerator support. The table below shows the 
effects of support measures for the subsample of startups that participated in accelerators. 
Only the direction and significance of coefficients in optimised models analogous to those in 
tables A16-A23 are shown. For example, “+++” represents a coefficient that is positive and 
significant at the p<0.01 level. Similarly, “++” is a positive coefficient at the p<0.05 level, and 
“−“ is a negative coefficient at the p<0.1 significance level. Starred (*) coefficients are new 
compared to the main models using the full-sample of startups supported by accelerators 
and incubators; coefficients in parentheses become insignificant compared to full-sample 
models. Dependent variables are: impact of the programme as perceived by startups; 
employment growth; growth in the number of employees with a degree; progression to a 
higher stage in a firm life cycle; innovation of products, services or processes; whether a 
startup is patenting (probit model); R&D expenditures (Log); and whether any additional 
investment was raised since applying to the accelerator. 
 Perceived 
impact 
Emplo
yment 
growt
h 
Employe
es with a 
degree 
Deve
lopm
ent 
stag
e 
Inno
vatio
n 
Paten
ting 
R&D 
(Log) 
Investme
nt raised 
Observations 180 172 173 176 188 160 196 184 
Support by 
programme 
        
Access to 
partners & 
customers 
+++   ++*  −−−*   
Access to 
investors 
++*      (++) +++ 
Access to 
peers 
 +++ ++      
Testing & 
refining 
business 
model 
+++ −−− (−)     − 
Help with 
team 
formation 
+++ ++  +++ (+)    
Direct 
funding from 
the 
programme 
(++) +++   +++  +++ (+++) 
Business 
skills 
development 
++*   +*  −−−*   
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Press or 
media 
exposure 
 +++  −−*  +++   
Lab space or 
equipment 
   −−*   −−*  
Legal, 
financial, 
marketing or 
HR support 
(+)   −−* +++* (−−) (−) −− 
Help 
measuring 
social impact 
  (++)  +*   + 
Office space     −−−*    
Coaching / 
personal 
development 
   −−−  +*   
Mentoring 
support 
        
Industry 
expert 
++    (++)    
Entrepreneur 
(not exited) 
+++*   −−*     
VC / angel  ++ +++      
Consultant, 
business 
developer 
 −−* −−  (−) ++   
Mentoring 
intensity 
  (+)   ++*   +++    ++  
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Table A25: Development stage of startups. This table shows the observed relative transition 
frequencies of startups from their stage of development when applying to an accelerator or 
incubator to their development stage today. 
 Development stage today 
Developm
ent 
stage at 
applicatio
n Idea 
Prototyp
e 
Post- 
reven
ue 
Growt
h Mature Acquired Dead Other N/A 
Idea 
2.7
% 11.3% 9.5% 5.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Prototype 
0.2
% 8.6% 
19.3
% 6.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
Post 
revenue 
0.0
% 0.5% 
14.5
% 10.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 
Growth 
0.0
% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Mature 
0.0
% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
N/A 
0.0
% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
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Appendix 5.11. Latent class analysis 
Table A26: Combinations of startup support. Table shows the results of a latent class 
analysis of startup support. Using six latent classes optimises the Akaike information criterion 
for the model with N=236 observations for which we have complete information on startup 
support and mentoring type. For each class of startup support, the model predicts how likely a 
respondent is to answer positively to each of the support and mentoring questions. For 
example, a value of 0.97 in the column of class 1 represents a likelihood of 97% that the 
respondent will have received office space if they are in class 1. The estimated proportion of 
startups in each class is shown in the first row. 
 Latent class of support 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimated class population shares 0.19 0.42 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.17 
Support type       
Direct funding from the programme 0.90 0.44 0.00 0.24 0.23 0.27 
Office space 0.97 0.74 1.00 0.53 0.28 0.72 
Lab space or equipment 0.33 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.00 0.15 
Access to peers 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.74 0.53 1.00 
Coaching / personal development 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.54 0.38 0.82 
Testing & refining business model 0.94 0.88 1.00 0.23 0.58 0.62 
Business skills development 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.35 0.45 0.76 
Access to partners & customers 1.00 0.89 0.73 0.59 0.37 0.31 
Help measuring social impact 0.52 0.20 0.27 0.05 0.15 0.16 
Legal, financial, marketing or HR support 0.91 0.84 0.97 0.22 0.09 0.57 
Press or media exposure 0.79 0.71 0.74 0.87 0.00 0.19 
Help with team formation 0.81 0.49 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.13 
Access to investors 1.00 0.92 0.66 0.71 0.26 0.35 
Mentoring type       
Industry expert 0.83 0.64 0.00 0.49 0.57 0.32 
Entrepreneur (exited a venture) 0.95 0.71 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.08 
Entrepreneur (not exited) 0.95 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.26 
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VC / angel 0.87 0.57 0.00 0.09 0.47 0.00 
Consultant, business developer 1.00 0.71 0.17 0.32 0.48 0.58 
 
Table A27: Impact of programme types. The table below shows the effects if startups 
receive any of the six combinations of support defined in Table A26. For these six 
combinations (i.e., programme types or latent classes of support), the table shows direction 
and significance of coefficients in our main models in Appendix 5.10, if support and mentoring 
variables are replaced with the estimated likelihood of a startup receiving support from any of 
the programme types (i.e. membership in the latent support classes) defined in Table A26, 
relative to the effect of belonging to latent class 1 (high-intensity support). For example, “+++” 
represents a coefficient that is positive and significant at the p<0.01 level. Similarly, “++” is a 
positive coefficient at the p<0.05 level, and “−” is a negative coefficient at the p<0.1 
significance level. Dependent variables are: Perceived impact of accelerators perceived by 
startups; employment growth; growth in the number of employees with a degree; progression 
to a higher stage in a firm life cycle; innovation of products, services or processes; number of 
patents (Log); R&D expenditures (Log); and whether any additional investment was raised 
since applying to the accelerator. 
 Perceiv
ed 
impact 
Emplo
yment 
growth 
Emplo
yees 
with a 
degree 
Devel
opme
nt 
stage 
Inno
vatio
n 
Patents 
(Log) 
R&D 
(Log) 
Invest
ment 
raised 
2: Accelerator-like       −−  
3: Mentoring-free −      −−− − 
4: External 
exposure 
−−−  −  −   − 
5: Mentoring 
focus 
−−− −     −−−  
6: Incubator-like −−− −  − −  −−−  
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Appendix 5.12 Impact on and effects of intermediate outcomes 
Table A28: Support and intermediate outcomes. The table below shows the direction and 
significance of coefficients in optimised models for intermediate outcomes, regressed on 
support types. For example, “+++” represents a coefficient that is positive and significant at 
the p<0.01 level. Similarly, “++” is a positive coefficient at the p<0.05 level, and “−” is a 
negative coefficient at the p<0.1 significance level. Intermediate outcomes are: Strategic 
planning, Product development, Recruiting and developing staff, Marketing, Attracting and 
keeping customers, Where to locate the enterprise, Raising Finance, Partnerships with 
external organisations, Leading and management, Managing cash flow, Adopting new digital 
technologies (e.g. Customer Relationship Management (CRM), Marketing Automation or 
Project Management software). To maximise the amount of non-missing data, we test one 
support variable at a time in addition to the predictors that were found significant in our 
optimised models for outcome measures. 
 Intermediate outcome 
 
Strategic 
Planning 
Product 
Dev. Recruiting Marketing Location 
Support by programme      
Access to partners & 
customers +++     
Access to investors    + −− 
Access to peers      
Testing & refining 
business model  ++    
Help with team formation ++ ++ +++ +++ +++ 
Direct funding from the 
programme      
Business skills 
development  −−−  −  
Press or media exposure    +++  
Lab space or equipment     ++ 
Legal, financial, marketing 
or HR support  +   + 
Help measuring social 
impact + +++    
Office space   ++  ++ 
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Coaching / personal 
development +++   +++  
Mentoring support      
Industry expert  +    
Entrepreneur (exited a 
venture) +++  +   
Entrepreneur (not exited)      
VC / angel    ++  
Consultant, business 
developer − +   ++ 
Mentoring intensity  +++    
continued on next page 
 
Table A28 (continued): Support and intermediate outcomes  
 Intermediate outcome 
 
Raising 
Finance 
External 
Partnerships 
Leading & 
Management 
Cash 
Flow 
Mgmt. 
Digital 
Tech. 
Support by programme      
Access to partners & 
customers  +++ +  ++ 
Access to investors ++  + ++  
Access to peers +++     
Testing & refining 
business model      
Help with team 
formation  +++ +++ +++ ++ 
Direct funding from the 
programme +++     
Business skills 
development  −  −− −− 
Press or media 
exposure      
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Lab space or equipment ++     
Legal, financial, 
marketing or HR support    +++  
Help measuring social 
impact ++   ++ ++ 
Office space     + 
Coaching / personal 
development   +++ ++ ++ 
Mentoring support      
Industry expert      
Entrepreneur (exited a 
venture)   ++  + 
Entrepreneur (not 
exited)      
VC / angel +++     
Consultant, business 
developer −− +++    
Mentoring intensity      
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Table A29: Effect of intermediate outcomes on final outcomes. The table below shows 
the direction and significance of coefficients in optimised models for final outcomes 
(perceived impact of accelerators, employment growth, growth in employees with a degree, 
development stage, innovation, patenting, and R&D expenditures). For example, “+++” 
represents a coefficient that is positive and significant at the p<0.01 level. Similarly, “++” is a 
positive coefficient at the p<0.05 level, and “−” is a negative coefficient at the p<0.1 
significance level. Intermediate outcomes are measured by respondents’ answers to the 
question “Since applying to [programme name], to what extent have you changed your 
approach to:” on a five-point Likert scale from “Not at all” to “To a large extent”, which we 
converted to numerical values for the purpose of OLS estimation. These models assume that 
all effects of accelerator and incubator support are mediated by intermediate outcomes (they 
include intermediate outcomes as explanatory variables but not variables measuring the 
support by programmes). Control variables are not shown. Results for growth of employees 
with a degree are all insignificant and have been omitted. 
 Final outcome 
Intermediate 
outcome 
Perceiv
ed 
Impact 
Employme
nt growth 
Develop
ment 
stage 
Innov
ation 
Patent
ing 
(Probit
) 
R&D 
(Pro
bit) 
Investment 
(Probit) 
Strategic 
planning +++ −      
Product 
development        
Recruiting 
and 
developing 
staff  +++    ++  
Marketing, 
attracting and 
keeping 
customers     +++   
Where to 
locate the 
enterprise        
Raising 
Finance +++ +++ − ++  +++ +++ 
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Partnerships 
with external 
organisations    +++  −  
Leading and 
management +  +     
Managing 
cash flow      −  
Adopting new 
digital 
technologies 
(e.g. 
Customer 
Relationship 
Management 
(CRM), 
Marketing 
Automation 
or Project 
Management 
software)        
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Figure A5: Pathways from support activities to startup success - accelerators only. This 
graph shows mediation relationships between startup support, changes in business practices 
and ultimate outcomes, based on the analysis in Figure 12 using the subsample of startups 
that participate in an accelerator. Sample size for analyses is between 166 to 192 accelerated 
startups, depending on data availability, per model. 
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Appendix 5.13 Supplementary methods for ecosystem level 
analysis 
To illustrate our approach, we begin by estimating the following “event-study” equation 
separately for early stage investments in high and low technology sectors: 
Equation 1. 
 
where b indexes regions, t indexes time, ybt measures the number/value of early stage venture 
capital investments, and Di are indicator variables for the “event years” since the first 
accelerator launch in the local authority. The sample includes all the local authorities in Table 
A30 during the 2007-2018 period. For every local authority in the sample, we have information 
for 2 years before and 3 years after the first accelerator launch. The rest of the βs are 
estimated using variation of the regions with accelerator formation late (early) in the sample 
where information for a window of more than 2 years before (3 years after) the first launch is 
available.  
We present the point estimates of equation (1) in Figure 13. Panel A (B) plots the estimates 
using the number (value) of early stage venture capital investments as dependent variable. In 
each plot, the solid line plots the estimates of the βs (relative to the year of the first accelerator 
launch, which is normalized to zero) l for the high-tech industry. The dotted line plots the 
estimates of the βs for the non-high-tech industry. Figure 13 shows indicative evidence of 
significant trend breaks in the number and value of early-stage venture capital investments in 
the high-tech sector following the first accelerator launch in the region (i.e., there is an increase 
in the slope of the solid line), that are not visible for early-stage venture capital investments in 
the non-high-tech sector (i.e., there is no change in slope of the dotted line). Moreover, the 
figure also shows no evidence of average differential pre-trends in the number or value of early 
stage venture capital investments between high and low technology industries (i.e., the solid 
and dotted lines have the same slope prior to the first accelerator launch). 
We combine results from the separate event-study plots in Appendix 5.14, Table A32. We 
report results of the following model that tests whether a significant mean shift and/or a trend 
break exists in seed venture capital investments in the high-tech sector relative to the non-
high-tech sector at the time of accelerator formation. 
Equation 2. 
 
In equation (2), b indexes regions, i indexes sectors (i.e., high-tech and non-high-tech) and t 
indexes time. We include region cross sector (abi) and sector cross time (yt) fixed effects in the 
estimation to control for time-invariant heterogeneity between the high and low technology 
sectors in each region, and for differential time effects in high and low technology industries, 
respectively. We also include local authority cross time fixed effects (0bt), which allows us to 
compare changes in early stage venture capital activity between the high and low technology 
sectors for the same region, before and after the first accelerator launch. We cluster standard 
errors at the region cross time level. 
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The coefficients of interest are δ and β, which measure the average change in the mean and 
slope of the number/value of early-stage investments in the high-tech sector, relative to the 
non-high-tech sector, before and after the accelerator launch in a given local authority. These 
changes are relative to all regions that do not have their first accelerator launch in that year 
(but have either already had their accelerator launch, or will have a launch in the future), as is 
standard in event-time studies (see Bertrand and Mullanathain 2003) 
 
Table A30: UK-based First Accelerator Programmes Founded 2008-2016. The table shows 
the names of the first accelerator programmes founded between 2008 and 2016 across 
different regions in UK excluding London.  
Accelerator Name Local Authority Region Year First 
Accelerator 
Elevator Aberdeen Aberdeen City Council Aberdeen 2015 
Propel Programme Belfast City Council Northern 
Ireland 
2010 
Entrepreneurs for the 
Future, Oxygen 
Birmingham City Council West 
Midlands 
2011 
First Bourne Bournemouth Borough Council South 
West 
2016 
Blue Lab Brighton & Hove City Council South East 2015 
Qi3 Accelerator Bootcamp Cambridge City Council East of 
England 
2012 
Innovation Lab Hart District Council_ South East 2016 
Creative England Digital 
Accelerator 
Hertsmere Borough Council East of 
England 
2014 
Open Future North Manchester City Council North West 2016 
Ignite Accelerator Newcastle upon Tyne City Council North East 2012 
Capital One Growth Labs Nottingham City Council East 
Midlands 
2016 
Beta Foundry Oxford City Council South East 2011 
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Drive with Belron Runnymede Borough Council South East 2016 
UP Accelerator Salford City Council North West 2014 
Dotforge Sheffield City Council Yorkshire 
and 
Humbersid
e 
2013 
Ideas Fund Swansea City and Borough 
Council 
Wales 2016 
ESA Business Incubation 
Centre Harwell 
Vale of White Horse District 
Council 
South East 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A31: Summary Statistics: The table shows summary statistics of the main variables 
used in the analysis.  
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
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Number 406 4.45 6.62 0 47 
Number non Accelerated 406 3.42 5.01 0 39 
Amount 406 2,790,203 10,300,000 0 121,000,000 
Amount non accelerated 406 2,496,098 9,601,757 0 116,000,000 
Log Amount 406 14.79 0.73 14.29 18.62 
Log amount non accelerated 406 14.63 0.75 14.13 18.58 
Post 406 0.43 0.5 0 1 
High-tech 406 0.5 0.5 0 1 
Post× High-tech 406 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Trend 406 1.08 1.83 0 7 
Post× High-tech 406 0.54 1.4 0 7 
 
  
The impact of business accelerators and incubators in the UK 
119 
Appendix 5.14 Supplementary results for ecosystem level 
analysis 
Our results from estimating equation (2) confirm that the patterns in Figure 13 are statistically 
significant: there is a robust trend break in early-stage venture capital investments in the high-
tech industry (relative to the non-high-tech industry) after the first accelerator launch in a given 
local authority (i.e., the coefficient of t×Post×High-tech is positive and statistically significant).  
The interpretation of the coefficient of t×Post×High-tech in column 1 is that the number early-
stage venture capital investments in the high-tech sector increases by 1.745 for every year 
after the first accelerator launch (i.e., the first year there are 1.745 additional investments, in 
the second year there are 3.49=1.745*2 additional investments etc.), which corresponds to 
40% of the unconditional number of investments (4.45; see Table A31). This estimate is 
economically significant: within 5 years of accelerator formation, 26 additional investments in 
the high-tech industry are estimated to take place in a given region, relative to the non-high-
tech industry. 
The coefficient in Column 2 of Table A32 shows that the slope increase in the number of 
investments following the accelerator launch is not driven by the companies that participate in 
the accelerator programmes—the estimated trend break continues to be statistically and 
economically significant, once we exclude accelerated companies from the count. 
Columns 3-6 show that the trend break in the number of investments, is also significant in the 
value of the early stage venture capital investments. The interpretation of the coefficient of 
t×Post×High-tech in column 3 is that the value of early-stage venture capital investments in the 
high-tech industry increases by £3.2 million for every year after the first accelerator launch, 
which corresponds to 114% of the unconditional value of investments (£2.79 million; see Table 
A31). This estimate is economically significant: within 5 years of accelerator formation, an 
additional £48 million are invested in the high-tech industry, relative to the non-high-tech 
industry. The estimate is not driven by companies that participate in accelerators: column 4 
shows a similar estimate after we exclude accelerated companies from the sample. It is also 
not driven by outliers: columns 4-6 show evidence of the same trend break using a logarithmic 
transformation of the value of investments. Columns 3 and 4 show an apparent negative mean 
shift after accelerator formation. However, columns 5 and 6 show that this effect is driven by 
outliers, as is no longer significant once we run the specification in logs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A32: Accelerator Formation and Early-Stage Venture Capital Investment in the 
High-tech industry. The table presents results from estimating equation (2). The standard 
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errors are presented in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at 
the borough cross year level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Number 
Number non 
accelerated 
Amount 
 (£ M) 
Amount non 
accelerated 
(£ M) 
Log 
amount 
Log amount 
non 
accelerated 
Post×High-
tech. 
1.243 0.841 -4.892** -4.607** -0.173 -0.163 
 (1.006) (0.904) (2.296) (2.180) (0.145) (0.157) 
Trend×Hig
h-tech 
1.745*** 1.160*** 3.236*** 2.820,*** 0.117*** 0.098** 
 (0.350) (0.313) (1.033) (0.991) (0.044) (0.048) 
Observatio
ns 
406 406 406 406 406 406 
R-squared 0.912 0.889 0.781 0.774 0.878 0.863 
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